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Abstract 
 
As a chivalric text, the Llibre contains many rich thematic seams. This dissertation, 
however, will focus on James’s chivalric kingship in action; the extent of his commitment 
to the idea of crusading; and on what light the text can shed on the nature of conduct of 
warfare in Iberia. 
The first chapter discusses James’s chivalric ideology and how he implemented this 
both in his dealings with his subjects and also on the battlefield. It will focus on his 
perception of what constituted honourable conduct and how he applied this in a practical 
sense. Through the analysis of this theme I will show how James’s instructive stories 
illustrate his perception of chivalric kingship in action and highlight how the Llibre is such 
a rich chivalric text. As already mentioned, literature on this theme, especially in English, is 
sparse.  
The second chapter analyses James’s attitude to crusading. It argues that although 
the Llibre rarely makes overt reference to the tenets and vocabulary of crusading, it 
nonetheless portrays James as a consistent and devoted supporter of crusade and makes clear 
that this exercised a great influence on his conduct.  Although Burns and Smith have gone 
into depth in analysing James’s piety, still very little is known about his attitude and 
ideological commitment to crusading, in spite of the fact that his crusading endeavours were 
many and frequently successful.  
The third chapter illustrates how the Llibre can be used to demonstrate the developing 
laws and customs pertaining to the conduct of war in Iberia in the thirteenth century. Warfare 
was subject to more exacting legislation in Spain than anywhere else in contemporary 
Europe and I will show how the text can be used to contextualise and develop this theme. 
To do so I will make frequent reference to the more theoretical Siete Partidas written by 
James’s son-in-law Alfonso X ‘el Sabio’ of Castile.1 
The main purpose of this work, however, is to illustrate how these themes are all 
intrinsically linked to one another by James’s perception of chivalric kingship. The Llibre 
should be read as one of the most important and instructive chivalric texts of the thirteenth 
century. James’s military renown as a crusader, conqueror and strategist preceded him even 
in his own time, but through his chronicle we can see that he aspired to be remembered for 
more than just his victories, but also the manner in which he achieved them. Jean Flori 
bestowed upon Richard the Lionheart the epithet ‘le roi-chevalier’ (the ‘king-knight’ or 
‘knightly king’), which though certainly an apt description of this illustrious warrior’s life, 
might just as easily be applied to define the deeds of James I ‘the Conqueror’ king of Aragon. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
1 Alfonso X of Castile  wrote a highly detailed civil code in seven volumes called the SietePartidas (Seven 
Levels), the second of which deals with secular society; Las SietePartidas Volume 2: Medieval Government, 
ed. R. I. Burns, trans. S. P. Scott, 5 vols. (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2001). 
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Introduction: El rei-cavalleresc1 
 
‘Truly stupor mundi’ is how the late Robert I. Burns described the life and career of King 
James I of Aragon (1213-1276) and a brief record of his life shows that he is deserving of 
this illustrious cognomen. James’s greatest gift to posterity, however, was neither his 
conquests nor his administration, but a piece of literature, his autobiography, the Llibre dels 
Fets (‘Book of Deeds’), a first person account of his life and achievements.2 This is an 
incredibly rich and unique text: it is the only autobiography of a medieval king, other than a 
fourteenth century imitation written by Peter IV ‘the Ceremonious’ (one of James’s 
descendants).  ‘No king in history ever revealed himself better to posterity’, and despite 
previous debate, historians are now agreed that it is undeniably King James who is doing the 
revealing.3 As Soldevila argued, who else could the author be? Why would they (other 
potential authors) have written the work as if they were the king himself? And how would 
anyone else have had such an intricate knowledge of the king’s life?4 Scholars, however, are 
less certain as to when James completed his work with most postulating that it was 
constructed in stages from the 1240s until the end of his life.5 
The purpose of the Llibre dels fets, as James states in his preface, is to inform his 
successors of the great deeds that he had managed to achieve through God’s grace, and thus 
to demonstrate to them how they too might achieve similar renown by following his 
example.6 It is, for all intents and purposes, an instruction manual in chivalric kingship in 
action written for the benefit of his heirs. As James’s career progresses, we observe the 
development of his talent as a strategist, the growth of his maturity as a knight and the 
consolidation of his authority as king. But the great drama of the chronicle lies in the 
accounts of the king's role in battle, the storming of castles, and conquests of strongholds. In 
order to stress the king's auctoritas and consolidate his chivalric reputation as a knight, the 
Llibre meticulously describes all those military actions in which the king emerges 
strengthened and conveniently leaves out or skirts round those where he does not.7 James 
seems most at home when he is excitedly describing his military campaigns. He takes great 
pleasure in recounting raiding and, in particular, siege warfare, of which he had much 
                                                          
1 An adaption and translation into Catalan of Jean Flori’s description of Richard I ‘Richard Cœur de Lion: le 
roi-chevalier’. J. Flori, Richard Cœur de Lion: le roi-chevalier (Paris: Payot, 1999). 
2 Llibre dels Fets del rei En Jaume, ed. J. Brugera, 2 vols. (Barcelona: Barcino, 1991); for an excellent English 
translation see: The Book of Deeds of James I of Aragon: A translation of the Medieval Catalan Llibre dels 
Fets, tr. D. J. Smith and H. Buffery (Farnham: Ashgate Publishing Ltd, 2010). I have used this translation 
extensively throughout, but have also consulted the original when necessary for precision and clarity. All 
references to the Llibre hereafter will use the abbreviation CJI followed by chapter number in brackets 
(these are the same in both editions). 
3 T. Bisson, The Medieval Crown of Aragon (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986), p. 84. 
4 F. Soldevila, Les quatre grans croniques (Barcelona: Editorial Selecta, 1971), p. 36-37; For a discussion 
regarding how the Llibre has been studied both as an epic history and as literature see J. Aurell, Authoring 
the Past: History, Autobiography, and Politics in Medieval Catalonia, (Chicago: The University of Chicago 
Press, 2012), pp. 40-54. 
5 D. J. Smith, ‘James I and God: Legitimacy, Protection and Consolation in the Llibre Dels Fets’, Imago 
Temporis. Medium Aevum, I (2007), pp. 107-108; R. I. Burns, ‘The Spiritual Life of James the Conqueror, King 
of Arago-Catalonia, 1208-1276: Portrait and Self-Portrait’, Catholic Historical Review, 62 (1976), p. 6. 
6 CJI, (1) 
7 J. Aurrel, Authoring the Past:  History, Autobiography, and Politics in Medieval Catalonia (Chicago: Chicago 
University Press, 2012), p. 51. 
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experience.8 Large sections of the Llibre read almost as a guidebook for the prosecution of 
war in the period.9  
The fact that the text is so rich in such detail and that it is the unique voice of a 
crusading king might lead one to imagine that historians of chivalry have made much of it 
as a source. Surprisingly, however, this has not been the case, at least where Anglo-Saxon 
and French scholars are concerned.10 One reason for this perhaps lies in language: medieval 
Catalan is simply not as accessible to the majority of scholars as is medieval French or Latin. 
The second factor is geographical: the English-speaking world tends to look first to France 
and the Anglo-Norman realm, and secondly to Germany and Italy for its examples of the 
norms of medieval Christendom, a trend that may well have been encouraged by Elena 
Lourie’s ‘Society Organized for War’ thesis. The argument that the political-military 
development of Iberia was acutely and locally unique, essentially severs it from pan-
European scholarship, which is unhelpful given the many parallels that can be drawn from 
the practice of war on both sides of the Pyrenees.11 These reasons in themselves, however, 
do not provide a wholly satisfactory explanation for the neglect of the Llibre. Another factor 
then is perhaps the aims and approaches of historians themselves. Both Richard Kaeuper and 
Maurice Keen, for example, are trying to build a case for the independence of knightly piety 
(as separate from the conventional piety of the Church) within the paradigms of chivalry, 
and the evidence of the Llibre does not always conform to their intended interpretations. 
Kaeuper, in his book Holy Warriors: The Religious Ideology of Chivalry, asks the question 
of whether knights accepted the claim of merit through crusading or rather through 
‘quotidian’ squabbles over vengeance, property, or the armed service owed to a superior 
lord. He then tells us that personal statements by crusading knights are rare, before citing 
some that back his proposition; the first comes from the chronicle De Expugnatione 
Lyxbonensi, which recounts the siege of Lisbon (1147).12 This chronicle puts words into the 
mouth of Hervey de Glanville, leader of the Anglo-Norman force, as he urges the knights of 
                                                          
8 There are countless examples of James engaging in siege warfare dispersed throughout the Llibre, but 
perhaps one of the most interesting comes at the siege of Lizana. Here James personally took control of 
aiming and firinga Fenevol, a kind of stone-caster, with which he states that he managed to disable the 
opposing Brigola by hitting and ‘opening its box’ which was full of stones and used as its counterweight. CJI, 
(463). 
9 For an analysis of James’s campaigns, military tactics and strategy as described in the Llibre see: D. J. 
Kagay, 'Jaime I of Aragon: Child and Master of the Spanish Reconquest', Journal of Medieval Military 
History, 8 (2010), pp. 69-108. 
10 The Llibre is not referred to in the following otherwise excellent works on chivalry, despite the fact it is 
strewn with evidence that could be well used to punctuate the arguments of these authors: M. Keen, 
Chivalry (Newhaven & London: Yale University Press, 1984); R. W. Kaeuper, Holy Warriors: The Religious 
Ideology of Chivalry (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2009); M. Strickland, War and Chivalry: 
The Conduct and Perception of War in England and Normandy 1066- 1217 (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1996); J. Flori, Croisade et chevalerie: XIe-XIIe siècles (Paris: De Boeck & Larcier, 1998); D. 
Barthelemy, La mutation de l'an mil a-t-elle eu lieu? Servage et chevalerie dans la France des Xe et XIe siècles 
(Paris : Fayard, 1997).  Though John France does make more significant use of it in J. France, Western 
Warfare in the age of the Crusades: 1000-1300 (London: UCL Press, 1999), this work concerns more the 
practice of war in the period rather than its conduct or ideas of chivalry. Robert Burns does touch upon 
chivalric themes in R. I. Burns, ‘Spiritual Life’, pp. 1-35, but the primary subject of this work is James’s piety. 
The same can be said of Damien Smith’s essay, D. J. Smith, ‘James I and God’, pp. 105-119. Aurell primarily 
analizes the text in context with other Catalan epic histories of the period (Aurell, Authoring the Past, pp. 
40-54). 
11 E. Lourie, 'A Society Organized for War: Medieval Spain', Past & Present, 35 (1966), pp. 55-75. 
12 Kaeuper, Holy Warriors, p. 81. 
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his multi-national army to remain united. Kaeuper argues that de Glanville uses language 
referring to shame and dishonour rather than piety to get through to these knights: ‘it seems 
equally obvious that in the pressure of the moment their [the knights'] vocabulary is more 
likely to turn to shame and honour, to the "sin" of disloyalty, than to more abstract 
theological arguments or terminology.’13 Indeed, the Llibre is a ‘rare’ personal response 
from a crusader, but it is not picked up by Kaeuper, presumably because it is not fully 
amenable to his argument. Yes, James does employ the same knightly language relating to 
prowess and dishonour as the De Expugnatione Lyxbonensi puts into the mouth of Hervey 
de Glanville; but he also fused it with the deeply religious language that Kaeuper is trying 
to expunge from knightly piety. For James, as a king answerable only to God, a knight and 
a veteran of several crusades, the two strands were intertwined: shame in battle would not 
only bring him personal infamy; it would also be dishonourable to God, whose work he was 
carrying out through his deeds. 
 
Themes and Approaches 
 
As a chivalric text, the Llibre contains many rich thematic seams. This dissertation, 
however, will focus on James’s chivalric kingship in action; the extent of his commitment 
to the idea of crusading; and on what light the text can shed on the nature of conduct of 
warfare in Iberia. 
The first chapter discusses James’s chivalric ideology and how he implemented this 
both in his dealings with his subjects and also on the battlefield. It will focus on his 
perception of what constituted honourable conduct and how he applied this in a practical 
sense. Through the analysis of this theme I will show how James’s instructive stories 
illustrate his perception of chivalric kingship in action and highlight how the Llibre is such 
a rich chivalric text. As already mentioned, literature on this theme, especially in English, is 
sparse.  
The second chapter analyses James’s attitude to crusading. It argues that although 
the Llibre rarely makes overt reference to the tenets and vocabulary of crusading, it 
nonetheless portrays James as a consistent and devoted supporter of crusade and makes clear 
that this exercised a great influence on his conduct.  Although Burns and Smith have gone 
into depth in analysing James’s piety, still very little is known about his attitude and 
ideological commitment to crusading, in spite of the fact that his crusading endeavours were 
many and frequently successful.  
The third chapter illustrates how the Llibre can be used to demonstrate the developing 
laws and customs pertaining to the conduct of war in Iberia in the thirteenth century. Warfare 
was subject to more exacting legislation in Spain than anywhere else in contemporary 
Europe and I will show how the text can be used to contextualise and develop this theme. 
To do so I will make frequent reference to the more theoretical Siete Partidas written by 
James’s son-in-law Alfonso X ‘el Sabio’ of Castile.14 Through his analysis of surrender 
treaties from crusader Valencia, Burns does at times use the Llibre to address this issue, it 
                                                          
13 Kaeuper, Holy Warriors, pp. 81-82. 
14 Alfonso X of Castile  wrote a highly detailed civil code in seven volumes called the SietePartidas (Seven 
Levels), the second of which deals with secular society; Las SietePartidas Volume 2: Medieval Government, 
ed. R. I. Burns, trans. S. P. Scott, 5 vols. (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2001). 
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must be remembered here that it was not his intention to specifically address this subject, 
but instead to chart the highly complex process of socio-economic development and 
assimilation in post-conquest Valencia.15 
The main purpose of this work, however, is to illustrate how these themes are all 
intrinsically linked to one another by James’s perception of chivalric kingship. For James, 
crusading represented the apogee of honourable conduct, and material gain (as delineated by 
Iberian codes pertaining to the conduct of warfare) was the natural reward for honour 
through prowess on the battlefield. The Llibre should be read as one of the most important 
and instructive chivalric texts of the thirteenth century. James’s military renown as a 
crusader, conqueror and strategist preceded him even in his own time, but through his 
chronicle we can see that he aspired to be remembered for more than just his victories, but 
also the manner in which he achieved them. Jean Flori bestowed upon Richard the Lionheart 
the epithet ‘le roi-chevalier’ (the ‘king-knight’ or ‘knightly king’), which though certainly 
an apt description of this illustrious warrior’s life, might just as easily be applied to define 
the deeds of James I ‘the Conqueror’ king of Aragon. 
I will use other contemporary Catalan epic histories such as the chronicles of Bernat 
Desclot, Ramon Muntaner and San Juan de la Peña and also documental sources from 
James’s crown archives and papal letters to corroborate evidence from the Llibre.16 I will 
also make regular reference to contemporary Iberian definitions of chivalry as espoused by 
Ramon Lull (c. 1232–c. 1315) and Alfonso X ‘el Sabio’ in the Siete Partidas (1221–1284), 
along with developing in more detail an interesting comparison with James’s kingly 
contemporary Louis IX of France (1214–1270) using Joinville’s chivalric biography.17 In 
terms of key secondary works, this dissertation owes a considerable debt to the works of 
                                                          
15 R. I. Burns, ‘How to End a Crusade: Techniques for Making Peace in the Thirteenth-Century Kingdom of 
Valencia’, Military Affairs, 35 (December 1971), reprinted in: R. I. Burns, Warrior Neighbours: Crusader 
Valencia in its International Context, Collected Essays of Fr. R. I. Burns, ed. E. Perry (Turnhout: Brepols 
Publishers, 2013); R. I. Burns, Islam under the Crusaders: Colonial Survival in the Thirteenth-Century 
Kingdom of Valencia (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1973); R. I. Burns, Medieval Colonialism: 
Postcrusade Exploitation of Islamic Valencia (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1975). 
16 Cronica de Bernat Desclot, ed. M. Coll I Alentorn (Barcelona: Edicions 62 I ‘la Caixz’, 1982). Very little is 
known about the life of Desclot other than what he reveals to us in his chronicle. It is believed that he was 
from Roussillon and that his chronicle was most likely written around the time that Peter III of Aragon 
conquered Sicily in 1282. Desclot’s chronicle is the second of the four Catalan Grand Chronicles, the others 
being the ‘Llibre dels Fets’, the chronicle of Ramon Muntaner and the Chronicle of Peter IV of Aragon;  
Crónica de Ramon Muntaner, ed. Vicent Josep Escartí, 2 vols. (Valencia: Institucío Alfons el Magnánim, 
1999). Ramon Muntaner (c. 1270-1332) was a soldier who wrote a chronicle of his life which also covers the 
reign of James I; CSJDP.  The Chronicle of San Juan de la Peña was written in the monastery of the same 
name at the behest of Peter IV as an official history of Aragon c.1370. The crown of Aragon is incredibly well 
documented, many of these records remain unpublished and unexplored in the Archivo de la Corona de 
Aragon in Barcelona. I was, though, able to draw upon two excellent editions of published documents and 
charters: DJI and Diplomatarium. I take final responsibility for all translations from these texts, though I 
would also like to thank two colleagues, M. T. Garden and Dr F. K. Young for their help with Latin, and 
Professor M. Rojas Gabriel for clarification of the Catalan. 
17Ramon Lull, The Book of the Order of Chivalry, tr. N. Fallows (Woodbridge: The Boydell Press, 2013). 
Ramon Lull, a onetime troubadour knight from Majorca, became a prolific scholar in later life and wrote a 
famous text on chivalry; Joinville & Villehardouin: Chronicles of the Crusades, tr. C. Smith (London: Penguin, 
2008). Jean of Joinville (1224 – 1317) wrote a chivalric biography of his patron king Louis IX of France with 
the express purpose of having his pious master canonised. 
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Ernest Belenguer, José Goñi Gaztambide and particularly to the collected works of Fr. 
Robert Ignatius Burns.18 
Before turning to the major themes of this study, however, it is important to provide 
by way of context a brief outline of the life and career of James I of Aragon. 
 
Contextual overview 
 
 ‘Our Lord Jesus Christ, Who knows all things, knew that our life would be so very long 
 that we would be able to do a great deal of good works with the faith we had within us.’19 
 
Born in Montpelier in 1208, James was crowned king of Aragon in 1213, at the age of five, 
after his father Peter II’s untimely death at the battle of Muret at the hands of Simon de 
Montfort. The orphan king then fell into the hands of his father’s conqueror and was only 
restored to his people through the diplomatic intervention of Pope Innocent III. From then 
on James spent his youth in the care of the Knights Templar at their foreboding fortress at 
Monzon in upper Aragon. This formative period had a profound influence on both his future 
spiritual and military development.  
During James's minority powerful factions emerged in the kingdom of Aragon and 
his own position was often precarious. After leaving Monzon in 1217, his kingdom 
witnessed almost perpetual civil war until he finally came to terms with his nobles in 1227. 
This untied his hands to embark upon the invasion of Majorca in 1229, completing the 
conquest, along with reducing Menorca to a client kingdom by 1231. Thereafter he turned 
his attention inland to take advantage of the disintegration of Almohad power in Valencia. 
The conquest of the kingdom can be divided essentially into three co-ordinated stages with 
a later unexpected reprisal. The first, between 1231 and 1235, saw James secure the northern 
half of the kingdom. The second half began with James showing steadfast resolution in the 
conquest of Borriana in 1236 and culminated in the fall of Valencia itself in 1238. The final 
stage, 1239-46, saw the addition of lands south of the river Xúquer to James’s new kingdom. 
It was during these campaigns that James demonstrated his talents as a general most 
prominently, not just on the battlefield, but also in his ability to plan, fund and provision 
subsequent campaigns deep into enemy territory. James preferred strikes at important local 
strongpoints to pitched battles; once these strongholds fell he would enter into negotiations 
with the lesser towns and castles of the region.20 James was not, however, able to enjoy his 
Valencian conquests for long as during 1247-58 he was forced into putting down a series of 
rebellions in Valencia, the most formidable led by his most implacable foe al-Azraq.  
                                                          
18J. Goñi Gaztambide, Historia de la Bula de la Cruzada en España (Vitoria: Editorial del Seminario, 1958). 
Goñi Gaztambide’s work is still the best and most comprehensive study of crusade in Iberia; E. Belenguer, 
Jaime I y su Reinado (Lleida: Milenio, 2008). Though not strictly a biography, Belenguer provides the best 
and most up to date account of James’s life and career that I have found. All translations from Spanish 
secondary histories are my own; Fr. R. I. Burns devoted much of his academic life to the study of Valencia in 
the latter thirteenth century and all students of this subject owe an enormous debt to his exacting 
scholarship. 
19 CJI (1). 
20 For examples see: CJI (134-136) for Morella, (159-171) for Borriana, (333-360); For an in-depth analysis of 
James’s campaigns, military tactics and strategy as described in the Llibre dels Fets see: Kagay, 'Jaime I: 
Child and Master’, pp. 69-108. 
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 Whilst campaigning in Valencia, however, James was forced to somewhat neglect 
his rights in Languedoc and the treaty of Corbeil signed with France in 1258 shows his 
resignation to the irrepressible advance of Capetian power in the region. 
 In 1266-68 he led his last successful major campaign in aiding the king of Castile 
against Muslim rebels in Murcia. The 1260s also, however, witnessed the return of civil 
strife in Aragon and the 1270s brought a further wave of Muslim rebellions and wars with 
his barons. These years also saw his attention turn to the Holy Land, but embarrassingly he 
had to abort an expedition there in 1269 and little ultimately came of his participation at the 
Council of Lyons in 1274. By this point James was relying increasingly heavily on his son, 
Prince Peter, to do much of his campaigning, but he too was active to the last, exiting life in 
July 1276 as he had lived It, in the saddle against his enemies.  
 James’s long reign coincided with much socio-economic change, not just in his 
realms, but also throughout Christendom. In this period the Argo-Catalan realm experienced 
the return of Roman Law, much encouraged by the king, which itself underpinned the 
increasing centralisation of royal power through more sophisticated methods of 
administration (the increasing use of royal parliaments and courts) and taxation. The 
economy also grew with increasing Catalan involvement in Mediterranean trade through the 
commercial centre of Barcelona. The king was obviously not directly responsible for all of 
this, but he was actively involved in many of these spheres. 
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1. Chivalric Kingship in Action: 
 
The aim of this study is not so much to discuss the strategic or tactical dimension of 
James’s wars, but rather the principles governing their conduct. It is, therefore, fitting that 
we begin by addressing the principle which he would wish us to believe inspired his conduct 
both on the battlefield and in his dealings with his subjects: chivalry. James reigned during 
a flowering of chivalry; though not all kings in this period were necessarily good soldiers, 
almost all were at pains to acquire something of a chivalric reputation.1 Chivalry is a complex 
word whose meaning encompasses the concept of an armed elite, a style of war and a code 
of military behaviour in which individual honour reigns supreme. In chivalric society there 
were different ranks from the king down to the humble knight, and the lesser did service for 
the greater, yet there was a community of shared values and all members of this community 
rejoiced in the title of ‘knight’.2 Though such values were, by James’s time, ubiquitous and 
relatively standardised throughout Christendom, it is pertinent that we turn to Iberian sources 
for our examples and definitions. 
Ramon Lull (c. 1232–c. 1315), the one-time troubadour knight from Majorca and 
later renowned and prolific scholar enumerated the key virtues of chivalry as ‘justice, 
wisdom, charity, loyalty, truth, humility, fortitude, hope and prowess.’3 His contemporary, 
Alfonso X of Castile (1221–1284), believed the four chief virtues of a knight to be ‘prudence, 
fortitude, temperance and justice.’4 Alphonso, James I of Aragon’s much lectured son-in-
law, had been the recipient of James’s own views on the key virtues of kingship, which were 
similar to those of Lull and may very well have informed Alphonso’s work.5 In a meeting at 
Tarazona in 1269, James advised Alfonso that he must always keep his word; that he must 
abide by the charters that he makes, and that he must be just and give justice openly.6  He 
adds, however, that he must retain all of the people under his lordship, but, if he cannot, then 
he must give greater priority to the Church and the ordinary people at the expense of knights, 
  
‘because God loves the people more than knights… And if he could retain all parts, 
that would be better, but if not, then he should retain these two, for with them he 
could destroy the others.’7  
 
This latter comment offers an insight into James’s own prejudices against the nobility 
and also into the distinctive nature of royal power: the fact that James can even consider 
advising an alliance of crown, clergy and common people as a potential bulwark against the 
knightly class tells us much about the potency and significance of the citizen militias in the 
grand scheme of thirteenth century warfare in Iberia. No twelfth or thirteenth century king 
                                                          
1 France, p. 39. 
2 France, Western Warfare, p. 53. 
3 Ramon Lull, p. 47. 
4 Siete Partidas, 2:21: (4). 
5 For a general overview of chivalry in the Middle ages, see M. Keen, Chivalry; For its religious dimension 
and knightly piety, see Kaeuper, Holy Warriors; For a discussion of Llibre dels Fets as a chivalric text see 
Aurell, Authoring the Past, pp. 40-54; Burns, ‘Spiritual Life’, pp. 1-35. 
6 James was indeed at Tarazona in December 1269. J. Miret y Sans, Itinerari de Jaume I “El Conqueridor” 
(Barcelona: INSTº EST. CATALANS, 2004), p. 234. 
7 CJI (498). 
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of England or France could have soberly considered counselling likewise. Nor was this 
merely a throwaway comment from James: he tells us earlier how he threatened his 
recalcitrant barons at the Cortes of Zaragoza in 1265 with the use of the municipal militias 
of the realm, noting ‘I have all the towns of Aragon and Catalonia that would be against you, 
and concerning warfare they are as skilled as yourselves.’8 
From James and Alfonso we can deduce that the virtues of justice, honour and the 
defence of legal right were paramount in their idealised visions of what constituted ‘chivalric 
kingship’. And there are certainly some wonderful examples of James embodying such 
kingly virtues in the Llibre - the most famous being his allegorical protection of the weak by 
his refusal to break camp at Borriana until a swallow that had nested on his tent pole had 
flown off with her fledglings. Here, the king stated that ‘since she had come under my 
protection,’ he was honour-bound to defend her.9  
This metaphor is certainly consistent with how James portrayed the sincerity of his 
protection offered to Moors who had submitted to his rule. He tells us that he fiercely 
defended their rights and punished anyone who harassed them. After the surrender of 
Valencia in 1238 he pursued and harried his vassal Guillem d'Aguiló who had plundered 
Moorish property ‘because [he] violated my law that the Saracens live under my 
protection.’10 Moving from the theme of protection to justice, James informs us that he 
promptly restored the Muslim property whilst drawing attention to his sincerity by stating 
that the Moors ‘recognised that it grieved us’.11 
It was also most likely to highlight his credentials as a defender of right and a 
champion of the weak that James includes the story of his protection of the widowed 
Aurembiax, countess of Urgell, whose lands had been seized by Guerau de Cabrera. Here he 
has the lawyer Guillem Sasala address him: 
 
‘God, my lord, has put you in His place, so that you may give justice and reason to 
those who cannot find either; and the countess requests that you defend her rights.’12 
 
The defence of legitimate right was a God-given duty of a king and James is at pains to show 
us that he was up to the task here and throughout the text.13 
 A further concern of the Llibre is its commitment to firm but fair justice, and it is to 
highlight this that James tells us of a ‘notorious’ incident of forged coins in Tarzona in 
1267.14 After proving the guilt of one of the principal malefactors (a priest named Marquéz) 
the king lectures him: 
   
‘you have done wrong, to God and to me, your natural lord, when you have denied 
the truth… and if you deny the truth, and I can prove it, you will fall under the Penalty 
                                                          
8 CJI (397). 
9 CJI (215). 
10 CJI (306). 
11 CJI (306). 
12 CJI (34-35). 
13 D. J. Smith, ‘James I and God’, p. 113. 
14 James was in Tarazona in September 1267. Miret y Sans, Itinerari, p. 402; CJI (466-471). 
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of justice. And if you tell me the truth you will be able to find mercy in me, since by 
the truth one finds mercy from God and earthly Lords.’15  
 
Marquéz thus admitted to everything, giving away his co-conspirators into the bargain. 
James then promptly had the leaders drowned, as he readily admits, whilst doing justice to 
the lesser actors as he ‘saw was fitting’.16 The king’s words here can also be corroborated 
by the documentary evidence as the sentence survives.17 Again, this story is surely included 
to be instructive. Not only does it highlight the importance of natural right and the justice 
one might expect in breaching this, but also how the king’s right and laws are divinely 
ordained.  
James, however, also found it difficult to always live up to chivalric standards and 
betrayed himself in his memoirs to be at times cruel, pompous, gluttonous and self-righteous. 
Indeed, his cruelty is shown on occasion throughout the text. For example, at the siege of 
Cullera he personally placed an artillery piece so that if it missed its target it would instead 
hit an area only inhabited by women and children.18 He even took pleasure at the death of 
one of his own sons, Fernando Sanchez, who had rebelled against him and was subsequently 
drowned by his half-brother, Prince Peter, when trying to escape in disguise from Pomar 
castle. James recalls: ‘this greatly pleased us when we heard it.’19 He of course, does not tell 
us of his most scandalous action, the removal of the bishop of Girona’s tongue, allegedly for 
revealing his confessions.20 However, other than this, James reveals the rest to us freely and 
‘nowhere in the Llibre does he seem beyond his times as gratuitously cruel.’21  
James’s vainglory is even more prevalent in the text: he constantly reminds us, 
sometimes erroneously, of just how young he was when achieving a certain glorious feat, or 
conversely, near the end of the text, he recounts Jean de Grailly stating at the Council of 
Lyons that ‘the king is not as old as people said, since he can still give a great lance-thrust 
to a Turk’, after a display of fine horsemanship from James. 22 His love of food and drink is 
also divulged throughout, showing us that he did not conform to the view of Lull, and later 
Charny, that temperance was a key chivalric virtue. This may well have something to do 
with the fact that he spent a lonely and hungry youth in the care of the Templars at Monzón. 
23 Lastly, not unsurprisingly, given its purpose as a book of instruction for his heirs, James 
takes pleasure in self-righteously lecturing those around him, most tellingly, his son-in-law 
Alfonso X of Castile and his own son and heir Prince Peter.24  
 It is in its depiction of chivalry, however, in a purely military sense as a code of 
conduct for the battlefield, where the Llibre is most edifying. In this regard, the most 
important themes to be developed are what it tells us about prowess and individual bravery 
on the battlefield, the qualities required of a commander and what constituted dishonourable 
                                                          
15 CJI (470). 
16 CJI (471). 
17 J. Zurita, Anales de la Corona de Aragon, ed. A. Canellas López, 9 vols. (Zaragoza: Institución el Católico, 
1975-80), 3: (72). 
18 CJI (196). 
19 CJI (550). 
20 R. I. Burns, ‘Spiritual Life’, p. 5.  
21 Burns, ‘Spiritual Life’, p. 26. 
22 CJI (535). 
23 For an account of James’s time with the Templars at Monzón see E. Belenguer, Jaime I, pp. 48-50 
24 CJI (498, 499 and 563). 
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conduct.25 It should also not be forgotten here, that because of his long minority and the 
independence this afforded his barons, it was imperative for the stability of his reign that 
James could be trusted to prosecute war successfully; kingly displays of valour and skill on 
the battlefield were a necessary incentive for his magnates to follow him.26 
 Indeed, prowess on the battlefield was the ‘key to honour and the most essential 
chivalric trait’.27 In a society dominated by intermittent warfare, commanders required their 
knights to show extreme courage in the face of the enemy, to desire glory on the field and to 
stand by their lord, even when all seemed lost. It was, however, perhaps even more 
imperative that a king display these qualities, for if he wished to encourage and persuade his 
followers to risk their lives, he had to fight in the front rank and show that he was prepared 
to risk his life as well.28 John France has argued that, in chivalric terms, a commander’s 
strategic ability mattered far less to contemporaries than his individual battlefield exploits. 
He provides the career of William the Marshal as a primary example: he was a model of 
individual prowess who exemplified the chivalric ideals of his age and class; but there is 
little evidence that he ever displayed real ability as a battlefield commander.29  
The most vivid illustration of James displaying individual prowess can be taken from 
his description of the siege of Valencia. Here, James was hit by a cross-bow bolt but made 
light of this wound so as not to dishearten his men: 
 
‘By the will of God, the arrow did not go right through our head, but the point drove 
halfway into my forehead… Yet we wiped the blood off, with the silk cloak that we 
were wearing, and we went along laughing so that the army would not be alarmed.’30  
 
This highly coloured account was corroborated when James’s remains were exhumed 
in 1835 after the sacking of the monastery at Poblet where they lie. Not only was there a 
large wound found in James’s skull, but his skeleton was also exceptionally large for the 
period and thus supported the veracity of Desclot’s famous description:  
 
‘This King of Aragon, James, was the most comely of all men and was greater in 
stature by a handbreadth than any other. And he was well favoured and sound in all 
his limbs. And his countenance was broad and of a ruddy colour and his nose was 
long and straight and his mouth large and well-shaped. And he had large teeth, 
exceeding white, which seemed like pearls. And his eyes were black and his hair was 
bright as strands of gold. And he had broad shoulders and a tall and shapely body. 
And his arms were of goodly length and well-formed and his hands were fair and his 
fingers slender. And he had strongly sinewed thighs and legs of great length and 
straightness and of large girth. And his feet were of goodly size and form and richly 
shod. And he was exceeding valiant and of mighty prowess in arms and bountiful in 
                                                          
25 For an explanation of what was meant by ‘prowess in arms’ and ‘the vocabulary of honour’ see Strickland, 
War and Chivalry, pp. 98-104. 
26 France, Medieval Warfare, p. 145. 
27 Kaeuper, Holy Warriors, p. 5;  Geoffroi de Charny, A Knight’s Own Book of Chivalry, ed. R.W. Kaeuper, tr. 
E. Kennedy (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2005), p. 21. 
28 France, Medieval Warfare, p. 139. 
29 France, Medieval Warfare, p. 141. 
30 CJI (266). 
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giving. And he was gentle towards all men and of great mercy. And his heart and 
soul were set on warfare with the Muslims.’31 
 
Here, James provides the perfect example to illustrate Kaeuper’s dual strands of soteriology 
in chivalry: fighting Satan, ‘imitatio Christi’ through warfare against the Muslims and in so 
doing enduring suffering or ‘Passio’.32 Kaeuper however, in keeping with the practice of the 
majority of scholars of chivalry, does not look to Iberia for his examples.  
To contextualise what James tells us, an important point of reference is Jean of 
Joinville’s Life of Saint Louis, king of France and a contemporary of James.33 Like James, 
Joinville too emphasises prowess on the battlefield as ‘the most essential chivalric trait’, and 
the most obviously effective way of displaying prowess was through personal bravery.34 It 
is clear that for James and Joinville personal bravery in the face of the enemy was virtuous 
even when it potentially jeopardised the overall success of their ventures, so long as the 
action was successful. James notes that his impetuousness to get to the forefront of the action 
during the battle for Majorca brought him a scolding from Guillem and Roman de Montcada 
who berated him that in risking his life he risked the entire enterprise: 'What if by chance 
you had got yourself killed?'35 Likewise, Joinville tells us of Louis showing a similar 
disregard for his own life on the battlefield when landing in Egypt. 
 
‘When the king got word that the standard of St Denis had landed he strode 
quickly across the deck of his ship, and, undeterred by the objections of his 
companion, the legate, he leapt into the sea… When he came to land and saw 
the Saracens... he set his lance under his arm... and would have charged at them 
if the preudommes... had allowed it.'36 
 
It is not just through his own conduct that James eulogises bravery, though this is certainly 
his most consistent example; he also shows his admiration for this virtue in others. When 
discussing the siege of Borriana (1233) James recalls the gallantry and courage of Don 
Bernat Guillem. Wounded by an arrow, which, we are told, was removed by James himself, 
James then dismissed him to recover in the safety of the camp. Don Bernat responds, ‘Lord, 
I will not do it, as I will get better here as quickly or quicker than if I were in camp.’ James 
valorises these words in his response: ‘we recognised that he was showing great courage, so 
we permitted it.’37 Making light of wounds is also a theme of Joinville’s chronicle and at one 
point he plays down the seriousness of his own injuries, stating that he was fine as he ‘was 
only wounded in five places’.38 Whether these incidents happened in reality or not matters 
                                                          
31 Desclot, (12). 
32‘Christ’s prowess joins his suffering… Two strands of soteriology overlap… Knightly imaginations could 
identify with each.’ Kaeuper, Holy Warriors, p. 130. 
33 Joinville, pp. 141-336. 
34  The quote is from Richard Kaeuper’s introduction to Geoffroi de Charny’s A Knight’s Own Book of 
Chivalry. Geoffroi de Charny (c. 1300 – 1356) a French knight and author of at least three works on chivalry. 
He was a knight in the service of King Jean II of France and a founding member of the Order of the Star, an 
order of chivalry founded on 6 November 1351 by Jean II of France similar to the Order of the Garter (1347) 
by Edward III of England. Charny, p. 2. 
35 CJI (64). 
36 Joinville, (161). 
37 CJI (173). 
38 Joinville, (241). 
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little; what is important is that they show the type of battlefield behaviour that James 
perceived as admirable and desirable in his vassals. 
 What differentiates James and Joinville’s Louis from other chivalric authors such as 
Charny – who focus almost entirely on individual knightly prowess – is the obvious 
emphasis they place on the role and example of the commander.39 Ramon Lull cautions that 
chivalry was not a licence to do stupid things: ‘chivalry and valour cannot be joined together 
unless there is wisdom and common sense.’40 Here, Alfonso X agrees, stating that though 
valour is the paramount virtue of the commander, he must also exercise caution:  
 
‘Those who act in this manner [impetuously] show that they are imprudent, and do 
not pay proper attention to what they have to do before they act; therefore, generals 
should be cautious, and examine undertakings before they engage in them.’41  
 
What separates James from Louis, however, is that he combined individual prowess with a 
proven track record of successful generalship. As one historian has commented, Louis’s 
‘actual conduct of military affairs was deeply flawed.’42 
  For James, bravery and prudence on the battlefield were not mutually exclusive, with 
the success of his actions testimony to this. It is at the siege of Balaguer in October 1228 that 
he first reveals to us his prescience as a commander. Quite delightedly he recalls telling 
Guillem de Montcada, that ‘guile is worth more than force’, after revealing that he had 
secretly been negotiating with the townspeople to surrender behind the back of their 
commander. Such guile would become a feature of James’s future campaigns.43 Later in the 
text, when describing an attack on Cullera in 1235, James shows equal pleasure when 
recalling the surprise and thankfulness of his army when he was able to provide them with 
the use of a fenevol (a stone throwing siege engine) as a result of his forward planning: ‘better 
the man who guesses beforehand than he who has to find out afterwards’, he reminisces.44  
James’s ability to think quickly in calculating the extent of the danger before rushing 
headlong in to meet it, was, in his opinion, one of his greatest virtues. The marriage of the 
two is best illustrated during the siege of Borriana in 1233. One night the Saracens sallied 
out to set fire to several hundred hurdles that James had had assembled around the moat as 
screens for the attackers. He was swift and decisive in meeting the danger: 
  
‘And as quickly as possible, we put our purpoint over our shirt, not waiting on 
anybody to put our large tunic on us… we went running right to the hurdles.’45  
 
His actions here were not rash, because they were successful – he had quickly and 
successfully calculated the risk. They did, however, display the qualities that he believed 
                                                          
39 As kings not only are they expected to set an example by their personal bravery and prowess, but also 
through their leadership and strategy. 
40 Ramon Lull, p. 49. 
41 Siete Partidas, 2:23: (26). 
42 France, Medieval Warfare, p. 39. 
43 CJI (43). 
44 CJI (193). 
45 CJI (172). 
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should be embodied by a commander: personal bravery, quick thinking and decisiveness.46 
Incidentally they are also the talents that have drawn fighting men to their commanders since 
time immemorial. 
 James also makes clear to his readers that a commander must set an example for his 
troops. After a hard fought campaign to take the frontier fort of El Puig de Cebolla in January 
1238, the king planned to leave the position to take care of business elsewhere. When his 
vassals got wind of this, they too began making their excuses and preparations to depart. 
This troubled James greatly. He felt as though his ‘labours were like those of a spider, as 
having done so much there, we could now lose it all in an instant.’47 To avert this disaster he 
not only elected to winter at the fort himself, but also sent for his wife and daughter to do 
likewise in order to convince his timorous magnates of the sincerity of his intentions.48 
James’s final instruction on ‘chivalric kingship’ is, however, the diametric opposite 
of honour through prowess: a warning regarding the torturous dangers of shame and 
dishonour. The shame that James is most concerned with is that of failing in his enterprises; 
here he is specifically warning his heirs of what they must be wary of. Nowhere in his 
chronicle does he tell us of his failed expedition to Peníscola in 1225, but we know that it 
happened; and its very omission is surely testament to the lasting scar and aspersions it cast 
on James’s sense of his own honour.49 Some indication of how James must have felt about 
abandoning this expedition is revealed by his deep distress at the very thought of abandoning 
his later siege of Borriana in 1233: he simply could not ‘return to Catalonia and to Aragon 
with greater shame’ than if he did not capture the town.50 He would actually have rather been 
injured by an arrow in such a way that he would not die, but would give him a just reason to 
retreat and stand before the people with his honour intact.51 Things became so desperate that 
he even tried to make this happen by twice exposing himself to the defenders so that he 
might get wounded.52 This may seem an extreme reaction to the prospect of retreat, but 
evidence from James’s thirteenth century contemporaries show that his fears were not 
misplaced. The Siete Partidas states that commanders must think very carefully before 
committing to an action, for if they fail they will incur shame, which ‘men must carefully 
shun on all occasions.’53 Joinville famously recalled a badly injured knight (his nose was 
hanging off from a sword blow), Everard de Siverey, who felt that he had to ask permission 
from the even more wounded and incapacitated Joinville, to leave the battlefield in order to 
                                                          
46 The Itinerarium Peregrinorum et Gesta Regis Ricardi, records a similar decisive feat of arms performed by 
Richard the Lionheart storming the beach at Jaffa: ‘So on the king’s command the galleys were driven 
towards the shore. With no armour on he threw himself into the sea first, up to his groin, and forced his 
way powerfully onto dry land.’ Itinerarium Peregrinorum et Gesta Regis Ricardi, trans. H. Nicholoson 
(Aldershot: Ashgate, 1997), p. 355; Joinville similarly recalls Louis’s IX’s courage and quick thinking being 
decisive at Damietta: ‘all should have been lost that day had it not been for the king’ – six Turks seized his 
horse and were leading him away when he delivered himself ‘by slashing them with great strokes of his 
sword’. Joinville, (236). 
47 CJI (236). 
48 CJI (236-238); Similarly, Joinville describes how staying in the East and sharing the lot of his army was the 
only honourable option available to Louis IX after the failure of his crusade. (427) 
49 DJI 1: (70 & 71). 
50 CJI (167). 
51 CJI (169). 
52 CJI (174); Similarly, Richard of Devizes records Richard the Lionheart at Messina 1191 threatening to 
remove the belts of knighthood of any knight who fled. Chronicle of Richard of Devizes, tr. J. A. Giles 
(Cambridge, Ontario: In Parentheses Publications Medieval Latin Series, 2000), p. 102.  
53 Siete Partidas, 2:23: (VI). 
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fetch and bring him back help: ‘my lord, if you think that neither I nor my heirs will incur 
reproach for it, I will go and fetch you help from the Comte d’Anjou.’54 This incident 
indicates just how acutely dishonourable retreat from battle could be, not just to the 
reputation of the individual, but also to his family and heirs. Furthermore, those who 
dishonoured themselves through their misdeeds in arms were expected to make amends to 
redeem their honour. During a siege conducted in the Nile Valley campaign, Joinville recalls 
how a wooden covered dam was destroyed and burned by Saracens on the Comte d’Anjou’s 
watch. As a result, a new one would not to be put in place until it was Comte d’Anjou’s turn 
again so he could make amends for his shame.55  
The adverse effects that acts of cowardice could have on a man’s standing in society 
are sharply revealed by the case of Count Stephen of Blois’s departure from Antioch during 
the First Crusade.56 Orderic Vitalis notes that Stephen 
 
‘was an object of contempt to almost everyone, and was continually reproached 
because he had fled disgracefully from the siege deserting his glorious comrades who 
were sharing in the agonies of Christ.’57  
 
Clearly, deserting one’s lord on the battlefield was cause enough for great shame, but it 
seems that doing so when engaged in holy war was the ultimate ignominy in the chivalric 
pantheon. James feared dishonour and shame above all else and despised others who brought 
it upon themselves. One of the few times that he displays genuine anger in the Llibre is in 
his recollection of an encounter with a crossbowman fleeing from the fray during the siege 
of Valencia. He seemed unharmed and James was incensed. He raged:  
 
‘You foul smelling villain, how could you abandon your lord? By Christ, you can 
never have done a worse thing! Dismount from your horse.’  
 
He then humiliated the crossbowman by removing his horse, weapons, his purpoint and his 
iron cap and leaving him with nothing but a tunic.58  
Both Ramon Lull and Alfonso X provide us with justification for James’s actions 
here. The Siete Partidas states that one may lose the honour of knighthood if he ‘flies from 
the battlefield; or abandons his lord…’59 Lull comments that ‘there is no such office that has 
been made that cannot be unmade.’60 He proceeds to state that knights who fear more 
desperately for the strength of their body when they flee from battle and forsake their lord, 
no longer ‘practise the office of the knight because of the villainy and weakness of their 
courage.’61 It is most likely however, that James chose to bring this particular story to our 
attention not just because he wished to highlight the dishonour one incurs by fleeing the 
battlefield, but also because it carries the double dishonour, as outlined in the Siete Partidas, 
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suffered by the soldier for abandoning his lord. Of course, James has much to say about 
those whom he felt had betrayed him – his long reign began and ended in civil war and he is 
only too happy to use the Llibre to name and shame the perpetrators. He dealt with these 
betrayals with characteristic ruthlessness. James’s mercilessness in dealing with those who 
betrayed him was, however, firmly rooted in contemporary chivalric values. Indeed, Ramon 
Lull argued that a lord who did not destroy a traitor had no business calling himself a lord 
(or even a man for that matter) at all.62 
On first reading, it would be easy to conclude that much of what James tells us 
regarding his exploits is more evocative of the chivalric deeds of the fictional knights of the 
Arthurian Grail Cycles prevalent in the French speaking world at the time, than of thirteenth 
century military reality.63 Maurice Keen notes that ‘in such stories the quest of seeking 
adventure and the simultaneous quest for union with God is fused together,’ words which 
would also provide a succinct, but accurate summary of the Llibre.64 Kaeuper adds that 
‘virtually all [such] romances present fighting and suffering as meritorious,’ and provides 
the example of Sir Gawain in The Story of Merlin, from the Vulgate or Lancelot Grail Cycle, 
where Sir Gawain had engaged in single combat and ‘had already been so badly battered 
that he suffered from it forever thereafter’; much like James, the proof lying in his exhumed 
skull.65  
Nevertheless, despite such extra-textual corroboration, we must also remain acutely 
aware when dealing with the text, that James I of Aragon is both the hero and author of this 
story and he rarely misses an opportunity to remind us of this fact. Indeed, the heroic actions 
of others are even written out of the narrative entirely if he felt that they had the potential to 
obscure his own. He barely describes the battle of El Puig (devoting two short paragraphs to 
it), which was the most important engagement in the conquest of Valencia, as he himself 
was not present.66 Fuller descriptions can, however, be found in Desclot and the Chronicle 
of San Juan de la Peña, which describes the intervention of St George and an army of celestial 
knights who supposedly ensured that not a single Christian was killed. Desclot, however, 
records the number of Christian dead to be three knights and forty-seven foot soldiers.67 
Similarly, there is no mention in the text whatsoever of the deeds of James’s son Peter who 
conducted two very successful campaigns against the Moors of Murcia in March and June 
of 1265, and which are noted by Ramon Muntaner.68 Other than the king himself, the only 
actors who have any meaningful and recurring influence on the narrative are God and his 
second wife Queen Yolanda, in that order of importance. 
In relaying events thus, James seems to betray himself as suffering from a degree of 
one-upmanship that is characteristic of the insecure; he always has to go one better than 
those around him. During the siege of Majorca, he tells of a Saracen algarrade (a stone 
throwing siege engine) that was the ‘best that has ever been seen’, and which could ‘fire over 
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six tents and penetrate into the army.’69 He then trumps this Moorish engine by saying: ‘but 
one of our trebuchets that we brought by sea fired further than any of theirs.’70 Similarly, 
James boasts that though he was in the last boat of the fleet to set sail for Majorca, by the 
first watch, ‘we found ourselves ahead of all the others.’71 As examples such as these 
permeate the text, it is only sensible that James’s chivalric pretentions should be handled 
with cautious scrutiny. 
 This however, is not an issue that is unique to the Llibre, but rather to all epic histories 
of the age. For example, like James, Joinville was also writing his history with a clear 
purpose, the canonisation of King Louis IX, and therefore undoubtedly took liberties when 
depicting the piety of his hero.72 Despite this, just as there can be no serious dispute as to 
James’s prowess, so too, it cannot be claimed, that Louis was not abnormally pious; the 
corroborating evidence simply bears too much weight.73 Incidentally, we can find proof of 
both assertions in two letters from Pope Clement IV written to James in 1266. In the first, 
the pope strenuously condemned his bigamous living with Doña Berenguera Alfonso, 
advising that he should instead follow the pious king of France’s example. In the second, 
whilst again admonishing James for the same errors, Pope Clement could not help but allude 
to his prowess in arms: 
 
‘You who overcame external enemies, have insufficiently overcome internal 
[enemies]. For what value is it to prostrate kings in the field, and to be vilely 
subjugated by a maidservant or servant in the home? Conqueror of so many enemies, 
by your own flesh you are thus conquered.’ 74   
 
 Despite piety being the primary theme of Joinville’s chronicle, chivalry is an 
imperative secondary one, and as we have seen, many similarities can be drawn with what 
James has to say on the matter. Indeed, when dealing with chivalry as a battlefield code, the 
factual accuracy of these sources matter less than their intention: it is not so important that 
James and Louis acted exactly as he or Joinville describe, but that through their commentary 
one can piece together an idealised code of conduct for the thirteenth century battlefield.  
Overall, the Llibre provides us with some invaluable first-hand evidence of chivalric 
kingship in action in the thirteenth century. James’s instructive stories clearly illustrate how 
                                                          
69 CJI (69). 
70 CJI (69). 
71 CJI (57). 
72 Joinville’s Louis is portrayed as pious to the point of impracticality. In the heat of battle divine 
intervention is regularly petitioned, often with an elaborate ritual performed at the most inopportune time 
– when the Saracens were hurling Greek fire at his wooden camp Louis’s advice was ‘…for all of us to fling 
ourselves on our elbows and knees each time they hurl their fire at us, and pray to our saviour to preserve 
us in this hour of peril.’ Joinville, (193); His religious observance in his daily life as described is also quite 
unfeasible: every time the king spoke he crossed his mouth as if to evoke the power of the holy spirit, and 
that when he was held prisoner by the Egyptians ‘the Saracens said the king was the most steadfast 
Christian that could be found. In proof of this they instanced that every time he left his tent he placed 
himself crosswise on the ground, and made the sign of his cross all over his body.’ Joinville, (367). 
73 Indeed as stated above, Louis’s piety was well known throughout Christendom, and was used by Pope 
Clement IV as a positive example for James to follow in a letter rebuking his licentious ways. Documentos de 
Clemente IV (1265-68) referentes a España, ed. S. Domínguez Sánchez (León: Universidad de León, 1996), 
(56). 
74 Documentos de Clement IV, (56,74); Goñi Gaztambide, Historia de la Bula de la Cruzada en España, p. 
200; 'Spiritual Life', pp. 26-27. 
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he perceived a king should rightly behave towards his subjects, dispense justice, and most 
importantly, conduct himself on the battlefield. Regardless of its precise authenticity,75 
James’s account gives clear illustration of how the key chivalric virtues of honour through 
prowess, the duty of the commander, and the avoidance of shame, could, and more 
importantly, should, be applied in a practical sense. Such evidence, especially when 
contextualised by other contemporary epic histories, gives us the necessary examples with 
which we can illustrate and develop the more theoretical contemporary works on the subject. 
There is, however, one key theme of chivalric kingship, that has as yet escaped our 
attention, and it is perhaps the most important of all: the theme of crusade. By the thirteenth 
century every noble in Christendom worth his salt endeavoured to forge a reputation as a 
successful crusader, and it is indeed no coincidence, that Richard the Lionheart, Frederick II 
and Louis IX are remembered equally for their chivalric exploits and as leaders of major 
crusades. If it was a king’s chivalric duty to defend his patrimony and rights, then surely as 
one of God’s anointed regents on earth, he was under the even greater obligation to defend 
and serve his heavenly Lord.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
75 It is worth reiterating here though that we can corroborate the majority with documentary and 
archaeological evidence.  
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2. The significance of crusade in the Llibre dels Fets: 
 
‘We wish to speak of good works, and good works proceed from and belong to Him.’1 
 
The majority of the ‘deeds’ recounted by King James I of Aragon in his own account 
of his life were officially sanctioned Crusades and it was through the completion of these 
‘good works’ that he believed that he was carrying out the will of God.2 We have evidence 
of James taking the cross on numerous occasions from his failed expedition to Peñíscola in 
1225,3 to the Council of Lyons in 1274, near the end of his days.4 James was even the subject 
of a crusading indulgence himself, as in 1222 Pope Honorius III granted full remission of 
sins to all those who would come to the young king’s aid in the event of a Muslim attack on 
his kingdom during his minority.5 On the face of it, therefore, it would appear that crusade 
exercised a greater influence on James’s life than any other external factor. Yet he only 
mentions once throughout the Llibre any direct tenet or institution of crusading – ‘taking the 
cross’6, despite there having been several obvious opportunities for him to have done so (at 
this point James had been on at least three crusades). Such neglect prompted Jose Goñi 
Gaztambide to ask: ‘where in his chronicle does he mention the support that he received 
from the Pope?’7  It is, therefore, the aim of this chapter to analyse the crusades of James I 
of Aragon through the lens of the Llibre, to look into why he makes little reference to the 
direct tenets of crusading and, most importantly, given the fact that he is inconsistent in this, 
to ascertain why James lays stress upon themes of crusading as and when he does. To answer 
this question, James’s campaigns against the Moors will be broken down chronologically, 
beginning with Peñíscola in 1225 and concluding with the Second Council of Lyons in 1274, 
as well as thematically.8 First, however, it is necessary to set the context of the religious 
nature of warfare against the Moors in Iberia within the wider historiographical debate 
concerning what actually constituted a crusade, and of the relationship between crusading 
and the Reconquista, and vice versa. 
 
The Reconquista and Crusading in Medieval Iberia 
 
                                                          
1 CJI, (48). 
2 For historiographical interpretations of King James’s relationship with God as described in the Llibre dels 
Fets see: Burns, ‘Spiritual Life’, pp. 1-35; Smith, ‘James I and God’, pp. 105-119. 
3 J. F. O’Callaghan, Reconquest and Crusade in Medieval Spain, (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania 
Press, 2003), p. 89. 
4 CJI, (527-542). 
5 La Documentación Pontificia de Honorio III (1216-1227), ed. D. Mansilla (Rome: Instituto Espanol de 
Estudios de Historia eclesiástica, 1965), (298-99, 309), nos. 404 (15 June, 1222), 419 (22 November, 1224). 
6 CJI, (241). 
7 Goñi Gaztambide, Historia, p. 169; though published in 1958 Goñi Gaztambide’s meticulous chronicle of 
the history of crusade in Spain remains the definitive work in this field. I have, therefore, consulted it 
regularly throughout this chapter. All English translations are my own however.   
8 As there are common crusading themes concurrent throughout the Llibre there will obviously be a degree 
of overlap. For example, James’s involvement in the Murcian Crusade 1264-66 will not be scrutinised 
separately as the relevant themes will be dealt with when evaluating James’s Valencian campaigns and his 
attempts to crusade in the Holy Land. 
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The first problem is to disentangle what has long been termed the Reconquista from 
crusade in Spain. The historiographical debate concerning the Reconquista is deep and 
complex. Much like the terms ‘feudalism’ and the ‘Byzantine Empire’ it is not one that was 
used by contemporaries and therefore was not defined by them. The traditional view, 
advanced in the nineteenth century by Martin Rios and built upon in the twentieth by Ramon 
Menedez Pidal is a nationalist and romantic interpretation depicting the Reconquista as a 
war of common Christian struggle to eject the Muslims who had conquered Iberian 
Christendom in the eighth century.9 In this interpretation the northern kings of ‘Asturias-
Leon-Castile’ saw themselves as the uninterrupted heirs of the defeated Visigoths and thus 
took up the fight against Islam in the name of Spain, the Church and common struggle. 
Reconquest hence permeated the following seven centuries of frontier warfare and thus 
molded and defined the Spanish nation.10 This centralist and nationalistic interpretation 
obviously appealed to the Franco regime and remained pre-eminent until the mid-twentieth 
century.11  
It was, however, strongly disputed in the 1970s in the groundbreaking works of 
Abilio Barbero and Marcelo de Vigil who set about dismantling it from its foundations. They 
argued that the Northern regions of Asturias, Cantabria and the Basque Country could not 
possibly be seen as the heirs of the Visigoths as they had been their implacable enemies, just 
as they had been the enemies of the Romans before them. Therefore, what happened in 
Asturias after this date should not be seen in terms of a reconquest of lost lands, but as a 
continuation of what had been happening there for several centuries hitherto: resistance 
against an aggressive and expansionist power; but where once this power had been the 
Romans and later the Visigoths, it was now the Moors.12 Josep Torró took this line of 
argument a stage further advocating that the term Reconquista should itself be banned, not 
just because of its historical inaccuracy, but also because of the nationalist ideology it 
underpins.13 Yet the phrase is still much used by academics, despite the fall of Franco and 
the discrediting of the traditional historiography.  
Garcia Fitz explains that one reason it has remained in common parlance is because 
modern historians have employed it in a neutral sense to encapsulate the process of territorial 
expansion staged by the peninsular Christian kingdoms at the expense of al-Andalus during 
the Middle Ages. For these historians, he argues, socio-economic reasons such as the 
growing European economy from the eleventh century and the development of the feudal 
nobility were the main driving forces of expansion, not the idea of reclaiming lost land or 
                                                          
9 For an excellent and in-depth summary of the historiographical debate surrounding the nature of the 
Reconquista see: F. Garcia Fitz, ‘La Reconquista; un estado de la cuestión’, Clio e Crimen: Revista del Centro 
de Historia del Crimen de Durango, 6 (2009), pp. 142-215; For interpretations in English see: W. J. Purkis, 
‘Eleventh- and Twelfth-Century Perspectives on State-Building in the Iberian Peninsula’, Reading Medieval 
Studies, 36 (2010), pp. 57-75; D. W. Lomax, The Reconquest of Spain (London & New York: Longman, 1978). 
10 R. MenéndezPidal, Los Españoles en la Historia (Madrid: S.L.U. Espasa Libros, 1991), pp. 172-176; 
O’Callaghan, Reconquest and Crusade, p. 3. 
11 Garcia Fitz, ‘La Reconquista’, p. 147. 
12 J. Faci, ‘La obra de Barbero y Vigil y la Historia Medieval Española’, "Romanización" y "Reconquista" en la 
Península Ibérica: Nuevas Perspectivas, eds.  M. José Hidalgo, D. Pérez y Manuel J. R. Gervás (Salamanca: 
1988), pp. 33-40. 
13 J. Torró, ‘Pour en finir avec la “Reconquête”. L’occupation Chrétienne d’al-Andalus, la Soumission et la 
Disparition des Populations Musulmanes (XIIe-XIIIe siècle)’, Cahiers d’historie. Revue d’histoire critique, 78 
(2000) pp. 79-97, pp.83-84. 
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religious motivations.14 Garcia Fitz, however, then counters this line of reasoning by arguing 
that if it was simply a political-military processes, ‘why then use the term Reconquista with 
all the problems it brings when other more neutral terms such as conquest or annexation 
would suffice?’ He answers that it is because of the ideological implications of the word: 
speaking of Reconquista is not only speaking of an ultimate victory, but one which is justly 
given.15 The pillars of this ideology, he argues, which were well known to contemporaries, 
were those of just war and holy war. Both had been developing in Spain in conjunction with, 
but also independent to, the ideas of crusade as espoused by the reform Church from the mid 
eleventh century. For Garcia Fitz, the Reconquista was presented as an ideological construct 
that made the peninsular war against Islam a justified activity: 
 
‘it seems clear that the concept of Reconquista is not only effective, but its use should 
remain operational. This is because this single term remains, without further 
explanation, the best way to explain the military expansion of Christian Iberia at the 
expense of Western Islam, coated and driven by a militant ideology rooted in the 
principles of just war and holy war.’16 
 
Regardless of whether there was any truth in the argument, Hispanic sources from at 
least the ninth to the fifteenth century argued with fluctuating degrees of intensity that the 
monarchs and populations of the Christian north were the legitimate heirs of the Visigoths 
and, as such, had the legal right and historic obligation to recover what had belonged to their 
ancestors.17 The Reconquista, however, was not a monolithic programme with clear goals or 
set institutions, but a series of often unconnected campaigns, conducted over seven centuries, 
against an ever-changing foe. It was a long-term process that ‘evolved and was shaped by 
the influence of successive generations’, that unfolded with fluctuating fortunes, in changing 
political religious, social and economic circumstances.18 Between the ninth and eleventh 
centuries, the Christians in Spain were mostly on the defensive and thus the chroniclers of 
this period barely touched upon the theme of reconquest. By contrast, in the twelfth century, 
amidst changing political circumstances, the possibility of reconquest became very real and 
hence its ideology began to infiltrate the pages of Christian chronicles with greater 
frequency.19    
But however closely associated they were ideologically, crusading and the 
Reconquista cannot be seen as synonymous. As Christopher Tyerman points out, a crusade 
was an event and the Reconquista was a process: ‘crusaders conquered, but if they 
subsequently settled, they did not do so as crusaders.’20 Crusades, on the other hand, can be 
more clearly defined, having a clear goal and a set of institutional practices and spiritual 
privileges. Though these were not strongly defined initially, they became more or less 
standardised by the Fourth Lateran Council in 1215. There are, however, those who believe 
that what Iberian historians term as crusades were not true crusades at all. Instead they see 
                                                          
14 Garcia Fitz, ‘La Reconquista’, p. 154. 
15 Garcia Fitz, ‘La Reconquista’, p. 161. 
16 Garcia Fitz, ‘La Reconquista’, p. 201. 
17 Garcia Fitz, ‘La Reconquista’, p. 162. 
18 O’Callaghan, Reconquest and Crusade, p. 4. 
19 O’Callaghan, Reconquest and Crusade, p. 18.  
20 C. Tyerman, Gods War: A New History of the Crusades (London: Penguin, 2006), p. 655. 
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them as campaigns of frontier conquest driven primarily by political and economic 
considerations. Tyerman argues that 'crusading did not set the military and political agenda, 
but followed it…[remaining] secondary or complementary to secular considerations and an 
older association of Christian conquest with religious war.’21 There is much truth in this and 
many Spanish scholars would agree with him. Garcia Fitz argues that while crusade ideology 
certainly augmented Iberian concepts of holy war, these ideas not only predated it, but also 
surpassed it with the Reconquista developing its own secular ideology of salvation.22 Goñi 
Gaztambide agreed with this view, at least in part, reasoning that the reconquest was 
certainly influenced by political, territorial and economic motives, but he adds the important 
caveat: ‘were not also the oriental crusades, including the first, motivated by the same 
forces?’23  
Those who promote the argument that only crusades to the Holy Land, and in 
particular, to Jerusalem, can truly be considered as such are known as ‘traditionalists’: they 
include the scholars Carl Erdmann, Paul Rousset, Hans Eberhard Mayer and, to a certain 
extent, Christopher Tyerman.24 Rousset believed that though the ‘Iberian crusades’ had papal 
encouragement, a degree of international character, because of French participation, and 
were also part of a general Christian offensive against Islam, they were not true crusades 
because they lacked the intention of delivering the Holy Land and were driven more by 
material motivations than spiritual. Furthermore Mayer argues that the wars in Spain were 
holy wars, but not true crusades: they were instead ‘a substitute for crusade’ for those who 
lacked the means or the will to go to the East.25 These theories are contested by the 
‘pluralists’, who believe that the crusades, wherever they were directed, were clearly 
definable military expeditions. So long as they adhered to certain institutional practices, they 
could be directed against the enemies of the faith wherever the pope felt that it was 
threatened. Jonathan Riley-Smith, the standard-bearer of the pluralists, believes crusading to 
be underpinned by three key institutional principles: the taking of the cross at a public 
ceremony where the crusader swore a vow to go on and complete a military expedition; 
papal leadership, whereby those taking the cross were answering a call that could only have 
been made by the pope; and the indulgence, in which the pope outlined the spiritual 
privileges a crusader would obtain on the completion of his vow.26 Thus, for the pluralists, 
if these conditions were met in Iberia, then the expedition was a true crusade. Riley-Smith 
goes on to state that by the 1140s the crusades – be they against the Wends in Eastern Europe, 
the Moors in Spain, or the Zhengids in the Holy Land – were one comprehensive enterprise, 
conducted by ‘several regiments of one Christian army’27. Tyerman, however, contests 
Riley-Smith’s ideas, arguing that much of what we assume to have been the institutional 
practice of crusading was not institutionalised at all until the papacy of Innocent III (1198-
1216), and that prior to this, concepts such as the indulgence were vague and malleable and, 
                                                          
21 Tyerman, God’s War, p. 666. 
22 Garcia Fitz, ‘La Reconquista’, p. 181-195. 
23 Goñi Gaztambide, Historia, p. 36. 
24 C. Erdmann, The Origin of the Idea of the Crusade, tr. M. W.  Baldwin and W. Goffart (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1977); P. Rousset, Histoire des Croisades (Paris: Payoy, 1957); H. E. Mayer, The Crusades, 
tr. John Gillingham (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1972). 
25 Mayer, The Crusades, pp. 19-20. 
26 J. Riley-Smith, What Were the Crusades (London: Macmillan, 1977), pp. 13-15. 
27 Riley-Smith, What Were the Crusades, p. 30. 
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therefore, difficult to define.28 It is important to note here, however, that the expeditions of 
James I of Aragon were all prosecuted in the aftermath of Innocent III’s pontificate, and that 
from this point on, historians agree that there was a clear institutional framework that 
regulated crusading.   
Riley-Smith’s thesis, first published in 1977, was very important in influencing how 
historians, particularly in the English-speaking world, viewed the nature of the crusades; but 
it is worth noting that much of what he assumed, at least where Iberia was concerned, had 
already been argued by Goñi Gaztambide in his comprehensive Historia de la Bula de la 
Cruzada en España published in 1958. Like Riley-Smith after him, Goñi Gaztambide 
postulated that not every holy war was a crusade, but only those with certain characteristics 
distinguished by the institutions of the indulgence, the cross, the promulgation of a bull, 
preaching, and certain privileges outlined for the participants - privileges that first appeared 
in the provisions of 1095 at Clermont and were returned to in subsequent expeditions. 
However, he goes on to state that some expeditions considered by the Church as crusades 
only met some of the above criteria, ‘therefore, the question is, which were the essentials?’29 
He answers by defining the key institutional tenets of crusading to be papal direction and the 
indulgence. Thus, only expeditions endorsed by the Church, with a specified indulgence, 
even if they did not have other attributes associated with crusading, were authentic crusades. 
Essentially, ‘the Crusades were an indulgenced holy war’30, the critical components being: 
‘official recognition from the Church and the indulgence’.31   
Both pluralists and traditionalists, however, accept the fact that crusading 
fundamentally affected and changed the nature of warfare in Iberia. While Goñi Gaztambide 
argues that there was always a significant element of holy war evident in the campaigns of 
reconquest, highlighting ancient practices such as the king of Asturias having his army 
blessed by a prelate with a gold cross before proceeding out to meet the Moors, it was only 
after the Clermont appeal of 1095 that the campaigns began to take on a more unified 
religious character. 32 
From the middle of the eleventh century to the middle of the twelfth the Christian 
reconquest made important advances following the disintegration of the Umayyad Caliphate 
at the same time that crusading ideas were introduced into the peninsula. Crusading influence 
came about as a consequence of the opening up of the peninsula to French and papal 
influences in the eleventh century with the principal vehicles being: the introduction of 
Cluniac monasticism, the pilgrimage route to Santiago de Compostela and cross-Pyrenean 
intermarriage between royal houses.33 Goñi Gaztambide and O’Callaghan would point out, 
however, that the relationship was reciprocal; that what was happening in Spain also had an 
influence on the Papacy’s thinking with regards the Holy Land. As Goñi Gaztambide asserts, 
‘In the mind of Urban II the Reconquista and crusade to the Holy Land were two parts of the 
same plan; both distinct enterprises, but running in parallel to the same goal.’34 Evidence for 
this can first be taken from the siege of Barbasto 1064-65 where Pope Alexander II offered 
                                                          
28 C. Tyerman, The Invention of the Crusades (London: Macmillan, 1998). 
29 Goñi Gaztambide, Historia, p. 45. 
30 Goñi Gaztambide, Historia, pp. 44-46. 
31 Goñi Gaztambide, Historia, p. 60. 
32 Goñi Gaztambide, Historia, p. 34. 
33 O’Callaghan, Reconquest and Crusade, p. 24. 
34 Goñi Gaztambide, Historia, p. 62. 
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a plenary indulgence, ‘an indulgence in the strictest sense.’35, consisting of ‘the remission of 
penance for confessed sin’, for all who took part.36 MenéndezPidal went so far as to famously 
comment that here: ‘The pope launched a crusade before the crusades.’37 Goñi Gaztambide 
concurs: ‘Alexander II ‘transformed the Spanish holy war into a true crusade.’38 While this 
commutation of penance was not technically an indulgence remitting the temporal 
punishment due to sin, it is worth remembering that the terms of the indulgence granted in 
subsequent crusading bulls in the eleventh and early twelfth centuries were also ambiguous 
with regards to the spiritual benefits they provided. Though Tyerman is critical of 
MenéndezPidal’s throwaway phrase39, it should surely be acknowledged that 
 
‘Alexander II not only lent papal encouragement to the war against the Muslims in 
Spain, but also recognised for the first time that the sins of those taking part in it 
would be remitted and the penance imposed by a confessor would be satisfied by 
their participation.’40 
 
From this point on the Papacy maintained a vested interest in promoting the struggle against 
Islam in Spain and was at pains to grant the participants the same privileges as were offered 
to those journeying to the Holy Land.  The first example of this comes from 1089 when 
Urban II granted the same spiritual benefits to those who helped restore the diocese 
Tarragona as to those who went on a pilgrimage to Jerusalem41.  
After the success of the First Crusade, crusading in Spain came to be regularly 
equated with crusading to the East and there are many examples of the papacy offering the 
same spiritual privileges, in terms of the indulgence granted. These include the First Lateran 
Council in 1123 where Calixtus II acknowledged that one could gain crusading privileges in 
both East and West.42 Almost a century later, at the Fourth Lateran Council, Innocent III was 
asked by the Spanish prelates in attendance whether the indulgence that he had formulated 
for the Holy Land would apply in Iberia and he replied to them that it would.43 Here, Goñi 
Gaztambide adds, that this was the testament (regarding Spain) that he left to his successors 
which they applied faithfully.44 In practice, the evidence supports Goñi Gaztambide; the 
Fourth Lateran provisions were issued to both James I of Aragon45, prior to his conquest of 
Majorca - through the Papal legate Jean d’Abbeville; and to Fernando III of Castile, prior to 
his conquest of Cordoba in 1231.46  Equally, whenever there was a development in terms of 
                                                          
35 Epistolae pontificum Romanorum ineditae, ed. S. Loewenfeld,  (Leipzig: Veit, 1885), 43, (83); Goñi 
Gaztambide, Historia, p. 50-51. 
36 Goñi Gaztambide, Historia, p. 50-51. 
37 R. MenéndezPidal, La España del Cid, 2 vols. (Madrid: Espasa-Calpe, 1947), 1: p. 147. 
38 Goñi Gaztambide, Historia, p. 51. 
39 Tyerman, God’s War, p. 660. 
40 O’Callaghan, Reconquest and Crusade, p. 25-26. 
41 La documentacion pontifica hasta Inocencio III (936-1216), ed. D. Mansilla (Rome: Instituto Espanol de 
Estudios eclesiásticos, 1955), (31, 33, 50 –53); Gaztambide, Historia, p. 57. 
42 Conciliorum oecumenicorum decreta, ed. G. Alberigo (Freiburg: Herder, 1962), (167-168); Goñi 
Gaztambide, Historia, p. 76-77. 
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44 Goñi Gaztambide, Historia, p. 134. 
45 Les registres de Grégoire IX. 2 vols, ed. L. Auvray (Paris: Bibliothque des Écoles Fracaises d’Athenes et de 
Rome, 1896-1955), 1: (268); Goñi Gaztambide, Historia, pp. 157-158. 
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the nature or scope of the crusading indulgence to the Holy Land, this development was also 
applied post haste to crusading in Iberia. For example, papal protection was offered to wives 
and children of crusaders in Spain soon after it was granted to the Holy Land. Indeed, largely 
due to the proximity of the infidel in Iberia, and the fact that crusading in the peninsula 
became almost endemic there, this theatre sometimes even took the lead in pioneering the 
formulation of crusade ideology. In 1118 Pope Gelasius II offered, through his legate, 
Archbishop Bernard of Toledo, the remission of sins, not only to the warriors who took part 
in the siege of Zaragoza, but also to those who contributed to the construction of the church 
and the maintenance its clergy.47 The granting of an indulgence to the faithful who offered 
not their bodies, but their gold in the service of Christ was an entirely new element in 
crusading bulls, but also one which would later become an integral feature.48  
Furthermore, through simple geographical and cultural proximity to France, such 
developments in crusading ideology permeated into Aragon and Catalonia more rapidly and 
in a less diluted form than to the rest of Spain. Though Linehan has argued that papal 
reformers did not have much success in promoting their Fourth Lateran ideologies in Spain 
in general in the early thirteenth century, he does, however, suggest that their agents were 
more active, and enjoyed greater success, in Aragon than anywhere else in the peninsula.49   
Therefore, it is clear that the papacy viewed what was happening in Iberia as just one 
part of a wider, more general assault on the Islamic world, over which they wished to retain 
as much control and jurisdiction as possible. Though the Holy Land generally took priority, 
and, more often than not, was the catalyst for developments elsewhere, the fact that on so 
many occasions the papacy sought to promote equality of status across the theatres, by 
continually granting the same spiritual benefits, adds weight to the Pluralist argument. Just 
as, in Riley-Smith’s words, ‘contemporaries, of course, knew perfectly well what a crusade 
was’50, so too Iberian crusaders knew that they were such and the conditions that made them 
so. It is in these terms, and with this definition, that the expeditions of James I of Aragon 
will be analysed. 
 
Crusading in the Llibre dels Fets 
 
‘The worthy King James,’ the Chronicle of San Juan de la Peña tells us, ‘wishing to 
emulate his predecessors, began to wage war against the Saracens, in order to announce his 
intention of destroying the Saracen nation and converting it to the faith of the Cross.51 If, 
however, crusading was James’s paramount concern in his wars, then one might expect him 
to acknowledge the fact in his Llibre that his campaigns were religious expeditions 
sanctioned by the papacy, and that reference to practices such as taking the cross would 
permeate the work; they do not. We have evidence of James taking the cross on numerous 
occasions, but not from him.  
This lack of acknowledgement of papal support for his campaigns is a theme taken 
up by Goñi Gaztambide, who rightly poses the question of James: ‘Where in his chronicle 
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does he mention the support that he received from the Pope?’52 The answer is very rarely. 
This was not, however, through a lack of reverence on James’s part for the Papacy, or for 
any particular pope – he is consistent in neglecting to mention papal support throughout. 
Indeed, despite receiving several stern scoldings from Clement IV for his somewhat 
licentious living, James, when he does mention the papacy and Universal Church, does so 
with due respect and veneration.53 
Instead, the reason for this absence lies in the nature of the warfare in which he and 
his contemporaries waged against the infidel in Iberia. Campaigns against neighbouring 
Muslim states were both regular and habitual for the kings of Castile and Aragon in the 
twelfth and thirteenth centuries, and as the majority of these campaigns were elevated in 
status to crusades by a succession of accommodating popes, crusading became endemic in 
the peninsula. Moreover, from a young age, almost every adult male of note and influence 
that James had encountered would most likely have been on one or more crusades. He 
himself was descended from a royal line that could boast of a service to God that was second 
to none: his great ancestor, Alfonso I of Aragon ‘the Battler’ (1104-34) was inspired more 
by the crusading ideal than any of his Spanish contemporaries.54 His own father, Peter II 
(1196-1213), who the Chronicle of San Juan de la Peña points out was surnamed ‘the 
Catholic’ because he was a supporter of the Church, had also been the hero of Las Navas de 
Tolosa, the great Christian victory over the Moors in 1212, though ironically he was later 
killed fighting a French crusading army at Muret.55 Such ideologies and institutional 
practices must surely have been drummed into him from an early age during his time in the 
custody of the Templars at Monzón (1214 – 1216); at this point he owed not only his throne, 
but perhaps also his life to the intervention of the Church.56   
The spiritual privileges of warfare against the infidel in Iberia would have been well 
known and obvious to both James and to his intended audience. There was, therefore, no 
need to spell them out to his contemporaries either, for they would have been well known to 
them too, far more so than they would have been to the men of Louis IX’s France, or to that 
of any other people whose experience of crusading lay almost exclusively in the intermittent 
campaigns to the Holy Land. With this in mind, it is perhaps more expedient to ask why does 
James discuss or stress the theme of Crusade as and when that he does in the Llibre? Though 
he is quite silent when it comes to the institutional practices of taking the cross, papal bulls 
and indulgences, he is far more forthcoming in his use of crusading language and imagery 
throughout. To answer this question in a structured manner, James’s campaigns that we 
know to have been crusades need to be analysed in conjunction with what he said about them 
in the Llibre. 
James’s first experience of crusading came in 1225 when, as a young man of 
seventeen, he targeted the coastal town of Peñíscola, which lay just thirty miles to the south 
of Tortosa; it was to be a sobering experience for him. We have clear evidence from his 
crown archives that he took the cross at an assembly at Tortosa in April of that year at which 
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he is recorded to have stated: ‘we have assumed the cross to attack the barbarous nations.’57 
He also proclaimed the Peace and Truce of God throughout his realms and asked this 
assembly of Catalan nobles and prelates to give him aid and counsel ‘to promote the affair 
of the cross.’58 We know nothing about this campaign from the Llibre, undoubtedly because 
the siege of Peñíscola terminated in dismal failure, and thus ended, at least for the time being, 
James’s dreams of conquering the kingdom of Valencia.59 This was hardly the stuff with 
which to begin a book of great deeds. This honour instead fell to what James considered to 
have been his greatest achievement – the conquest of Majorca.  
Again, we know here that James both took the cross and proclaimed the Peace and 
Truce of God throughout his realms prior to campaigning, but again he does not reveal this 
information to us himself. We do, however, have the account of Bernat Desclot, which 
confirms that James took the cross at Lleida in March 1229. He states that James 
  
‘gave the cardinal [Jean d’Abbeville the Papal Legate] a bit of lace that he had 
fashioned into a cross and the cardinal stitched it to James’s clothing. Then the bishop 
of Barcelona and the archdeacon and the sacristan, and other nobles who had come 
with the king took the cross from the hands of the cardinal’.60  
 
Indeed, on this occasion, the indulgence here was granted by Gregory IX through his 
legate, Jean d’Abbeville, who happened to be in Iberia on a mission to bring the Spanish 
church up to Fourth Lateran standards.61 Though it was not his primary purpose for being 
there, d’Abbeville had been instructed by the pope to ‘grant the accustomed indulgences’, 
‘if an army shall be organised in that region against the Moors’.62 This indulgence was 
drafted in quite an ambiguous form so that it could be used anywhere in Spain that 
d’Abbeville thought appropriate, and further highlights the commitment of the papacy to the 
promotion of crusade in Iberia.63  
It is in his description of the Majorcan campaign 1229-31 that James is most 
forthcoming in his references to the tenets of crusading ideology and most obvious in his 
employment of its language. This part of the Llibre is littered with religious imagery, and 
James’s Majorcan campaign is presented to have been divinely ordained from its inception.  
When on 21 December 1228 he unveiled his invasion plans to a Cort of his magnates 
at Barcelona he stated, ‘for we wish to speak of good works, and good works proceed from 
and belong to Him.’64 This is a clear expression that James regarded the expedition as having 
a spiritual nature, led by God, through James as his conduit on earth. The king’s speech is 
then answered by the Archbishop Aspáreg of Tarragona who expressed (or James has him 
express) the same sentiment. ‘Our Lord, who is Lord of you and us, has given you the will 
to pronounce these good words.’65 The crusading imagery then reaches a crescendo with the 
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bishop of Barcelona quoting Matthew 17:5, ‘Ecce, Filius Meus dilectus, qui in corde Meo 
placuit’66, and finishing with: 
 
‘And the same may be said of you, that you are a son of our Lord, at such a time as 
you wish to pursue the enemies of the Faith and of the cross.’67  
 
The crusading nature of the expedition is spelled out by James as he addresses his fleet before 
embarking on the voyage to Majorca:  
 
‘And we set out on this voyage in the faith of God and for those who do not believe 
in Him, going against them for two reasons: to convert them or to destroy them, and 
to return that kingdom to the faith of Our Lord.’68  
 
It is worth noting here that the crusading spirit that James has his clergy express at the Cort 
of Barcelona is confirmed in sentiment if not verbatim by Desclot, who has the archbishop 
of Tarragona state that what James will do for God is also for the benefit of all Christendom.  
Desclot next records the bishop of Barcelona saying that ‘the conquest is a great honour for 
all of Christianity and will be of great benefit for us and for all that come after us.’69 Later 
in the campaign, before the battle of Porto Pí, the bishop of Barcelona reiterates to the army 
the spiritual benefits they may expect if they die in battle: ‘those who die in this deed will 
do so in the name of our Lord and they will receive paradise.’70 In the aftermath of this battle 
James touches upon another of the key themes of crusading, passio (suffering) and imitatio 
Christi (following the ways of Christ), which also came to influence chivalry’s religious 
context. The idea that the warrior, through his suffering for Christ on the battlefield was in 
some way following His ways by imitating His passion.  
When James heard that his second-in-command Guillem de Montcada had lost his 
life he said to his soldiers: ‘worthy men, these nobles died in the service of God and in our 
service.’71 Desclot also tells of similar sentiments expressed by James’s army prior to siege 
of Majorca: ‘Just as Jesus Christ willingly died for them, everyone was willing to die for 
Jesus Christ if it were necessary.’72 
In the morning, prior to the final attack on the city of Majorca itself James recounts 
that his army heard mass and received ‘the body of Jesus Christ’. 73 He then entreated his 
men to prosecute the attack, but reports that at first, they would not move. Anguished at the 
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disobedience of his army, James ‘called upon the mother of God,’ asking her to appeal to 
her son on his behalf to prevent him and his army from being dishonoured.74 After this he 
called on them a further three times to attack and they eventually began their march shouting: 
‘Santa Maria! Santa Maria!’75 James’s devotion to Mary is certainly an important and a 
common theme of the Llibre: he regularly beseeched her in his prayers and honoured her 
with numerous churches and altars built in her name. After the capture of Murcia in 1266 he 
comments that ‘in all the great towns that God has granted unto us to win from the Saracens 
we have built a church to Our Lady Saint Mary.’76 His dedication was shared by many of 
his crusading contemporaries, including Louis IX of France and Joinville. They believed that 
by entreating Mary with their suffering, she, as a mother, would show pity and intercede 
with her Son on their behalf. 77   
The theme of Mary as the warrior’s protector is also taken up in the Poem of the Cid 
(c. 1140 - 1207).78 When the Cid is leaving Burgos to go into exile he calls upon her: ‘O 
Glorious Virgin, protect me as I depart, and help and succour me night and day.’ Likewise 
for James, Mary served as his patron and protector and he would do her great honour through 
his deeds.79 
It was also during the climactic moments of the siege of Majorca that James makes 
his first and only reference in the Llibre to miraculous or divine aid during his campaigns.80 
St George (the patron saint of Aragon), he tells us, was seen by the Saracens leading the 
Christian charge into the breach. It is important to also stress here however, that James does 
not admit himself to having seen the apparition, but assumes that the ‘white knight, with 
white weapons’, must have been St George, as James had ‘found it written in histories that 
in other battles between Christians and the Saracens he has been seen many times’.81   
James’s reticence here is interesting. He clearly wanted his expedition to be linked 
through St George to other legendary Christian endeavours, such as the Battle of Antioch 
(1098), where the same saint had reputedly led the armies of the First Crusade to an unlikely 
victory, but he also cannot quite bring himself to say that he personally had seen something 
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that he had not. The Chronicle of San Juan de la Peña endorses and expands on this episode: 
‘many of the saints aided him [James] and his subjects fighting for him when he struggled 
against the Saracens.’ It also provides evidence of a further spectral intervention of ‘St 
George and an army of celestial knights’ at the later battle of el Puig in 1237, with whose 
aid ‘the Christians gained the day without one of them dying’.82 Conspicuously, James 
makes no reference to this happening.  
Indeed, James’s reluctance to endorse the miraculous is certainly at odds with most 
other contemporary accounts of crusading. Joinville displays no such caution in his 
biography of St Louis, where God, Mary and the saints regularly intervene on the crusaders’ 
behalf.  This is perhaps because of the fact that the majority of contemporary accounts of 
crusading were written by churchmen who had an obvious interest in promoting the celestial 
above the secular, or, as in Joinville’s case, the chronicle was written partly with an 
ecclesiastical audience in mind – Joinville was writing in part to promote the canonisation 
of Louis IX and with Louis’s military record on crusade leaving much to be desired, he 
needed all of the celestial help that he could get.  
James, however, believed that he had a unique and personal relationship with God, 
whose ‘good works’ he was carrying out through his deeds. Emboldened and secure in the 
protection of the Mother of God, his patron, he clearly did not feel compelled to share his 
glory with any celestial army. Therefore, though James neither tells us that he took the cross 
prior to embarking on his campaign nor that his enterprise was the subject of two papal 
bulls83, it is clear from the pious language and religious imagery that he uses to describe it, 
his Marian devotion, and his uncharacteristic allusion to divine intervention, that the 
conquest was spiritually motivated.  
Yet while his piety here seems beyond doubt another motivation is clearly evident; 
his pride. According to Desclot, pride was the original cause for the invasion of Majorca.  
He relates how in 1228 two Catalan ships had captured a galley belonging to the King of 
Majorca, who retaliated by seizing two ships from Barcelona and imprisoning their crews. 
On a demand by James for reparation, the Moorish sovereign consulted the merchants of 
Pisa, Genoa, and Provence, who were on the island, who pointed to James’s failure at 
Peñíscola84 and counselled the rejection of his demands. The Emir acted on this advice and 
followed up his refusal by asking: ‘who is the king who makes such a request?’ The question 
provoked the retort: ‘the son of that King of Aragon who conquered the Moors in that great 
and famous battle of Ubeda [Las Navas de Tolosa].’ The Emir’s envoy barely escaped with 
his life.85  Though such an exchange may seem small reason for the launching of a dangerous 
seaborne invasion, it was a slight to James’s honour, as well as a challenge to his power and 
authority, and as we have seen, James feared dishonor above all else.  
An anecdote he gives later regarding al-Azraq, his greatest and longest-standing 
Moorish adversary, helps us to contextualise his feelings towards the snub he may have 
received from the King of Majorca. King Alfonso X of Castile was out hunting in Alicante 
where he happened to meet al-Azraq and a party of Moorish warriors. When Alfonso asked 
them if they knew how to hunt, al-Azraq replied that, ‘if he wanted, he would hunt castles 
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of the king of Aragon.’ When James found out these words, he was quite furious, but later 
delighted in recounting that  
 
‘when we had taken from al-Azraq all that he had and we had expelled him from our 
land, we remembered these words; and we had a letter written to the king of Castile… 
And we let him know that we had taken sixteen castles from al-Azraq in eight days, 
and that we knew how to hunt in the way that we related to him.’86  
 
James himself does not mention this diplomatic incident as a pretext for Majorca’s 
conquest, but he nevertheless reveals his pride and practical adoption of crusade to achieve 
this worldly objective. When presenting his aims to his assembled nobles he gives three 
reasons why it is both in their and his interests that the expedition is a success: honour, 'you 
and we increase our worth'; glory, 'will seem a marvellous thing...’ and crusade, 'for you will 
have taken a land and kingdom in the sea there where God wished to fashion it.'87 It is 
perhaps revealing, one may argue, of James’s personal motivations that crusade is cited last 
of his three reasons for going. Thus it may seem that James’s personal honour (‘worth’ and 
‘glory’) came first and the service of God last. This interpretation, however, fails to take into 
account how vitally important service to God through deeds of arms was in procuring honour 
and renown in the thirteenth century. For James, the themes of secular glory and religious 
idealism were inseparable during his conquest of Majorca.88 Norman Housley advises 
caution when dealing with the motivations of crusader kings. He argues that kings carried 
obligations of rank that made their experience of crusading different from that of others, 
making it difficult to disentangle their dynastic ambitions from their spiritual stimuli. He 
states: 
 
‘In the case of those Crusades that were commanded by crowned rulers we face a 
different set of issues. Such leaders did not regard it as wrong to conquer while they 
were engaged in God’s work.’89 
 
In this, James was no different. By conquering Majorca he would certainly increase his 
worldly honour and renown, but in doing so he was also honouring God as the earthly 
conduit for His divine will. For James it was impossible to disentangle the two.  
This theme is perhaps best explained by an interesting anecdote concerning James’s 
voyage. A violent storm in the Mediterranean threatened to end the campaign almost before 
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it had even begun. James, in panic, offered up a prayer that shows us just how interconnected 
he believed his secular glory and the honour due to God to be:  
 
‘…Lord, my Creator, help me… in this very great peril, so that this very important 
deed which I have begun is not lost. Since not only would the loss be mine, but Yours 
would be the greater loss, as I have undertaken this voyage to exalt the faith that You 
have given me, and to subdue and destroy those who do not believe in You.’90  
 
Here James is clearly trying to bargain with God, outlining the fact that he was merely 
carrying out His will and, therefore, the dishonour of failure would be of greater harm to 
God and to the faith than it would be to him. It also reveals the unique two-way relationship 
that James obviously felt that he, as a sovereign, enjoyed with God – a theme that will be 
developed further forthwith. Of the three aims presented to his barons prior to the conquest 
– honour, glory and crusade – one can see, that for James, the service of God did not come 
last, but first, second and third. For if he increased his ‘worth’ through conquest, or achieved 
great glory in battle against the Saracens then God too, in James’s reasoning, would be 
equally honoured. A very similar attitude can be seen in Richard of Devizes’ account of 
Richard I’s crusade, and especially the speech given to Richard on having to retreat from 
Jerusalem in 1192. Devizes has Richard lament:  
 
‘‘O God, said he, “O God, my God, why hast though forsaken me? For whom have 
we foolish Christians, for whom have we English come hither from the furthest parts 
of the earth to bear our arms? Is it not for the God of the Christians? O fie! How good 
art thou to us thy people, who now are for thy name given up to the sword; we shall 
become a portion for foxes. O how unwilling should I be to forsake thee in so forlorn 
and dreadful position, were I thy lord and advocate as thou art mine! In sooth my 
standards will be despised, not through my fault, but through thine; in sooth not 
through any cowardice of my warfare, art thou thyself, my King and my God, and 
not Richard thy vassal.’91 
 
James is never more ebullient in equating his deeds with the will of God than in his 
descriptions of the Majorcan campaign.92 From the unveiling of his invasion plans at the 
Cort in Barcelona in December 1228 to the completion of his conquest, the Llibre is full of 
crusading imagery. The same themes are returned to later on in his descriptions of his 
subsequent wars with the Saracens, but never to the same extent or with the same feverish 
intensity. Why is this? James does not explicitly tell us, so any answer must be based on 
educated speculation, but there are several possible reasons.  
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The fact that Majorca was James’s first success against the Moors after his failure at 
Peñíscola in 1225 must have meant that it always retained special importance in his memory. 
His age of just twenty-one years old when he accomplished these deeds, must also be 
considered; for we often recall the exploits of our youth through a prism of idealism. More 
important, however, is the fact that the conquest of Majorca was a seaborne invasion, making 
it unique in relation to the rest of his victories against the Moors. The crossing of the 
Mediterranean meant that the risk of disaster and dishonour involved in this campaign was 
far more acute when compared with an attack across a land border. In this regard the 
Majorcan campaign more closely resembled a crusade to the East than an Iberian one. None 
of James’s immediate ancestors or Castilian contemporaries had achieved a similar feat. 
Even his father Peter II, the hero of Las Navas de Tolosa, had not campaigned against the 
infidel across the sea. James seems aware of this fact. At the Cort of Barcelona that preceded 
the invasion he has the Count of Empúries state that the conquest of Majorca would ‘be the 
best deed that the Christians have carried out in a hundred years.’93 This was obviously also 
the opinion of James himself.  The greater the risk involved – James’s fleet was almost 
destroyed in a storm before it set off – also perhaps led him to feel that his success owed 
more to the will of God.  
Furthermore, James also shows us throughout the Llibre that he was acutely aware 
of the pre-eminence in esteem of crusading to the East. He attempted to campaign there three 
times, but despite his best intentions, was never able to successfully lead an expedition.94 
Majorca was thus as close as he got to campaigning against the infidel across the sea, and it 
is possible that he places greater emphasis on the crusading nature of this campaign to 
exonerate his subsequent failed attempts to reach the Holy Land.  
After the conquest of Majorca, explicit references to crusading ideology become 
sparser in the Llibre. This is not to say that themes such as carrying out the ‘will and work’ 
of God and James’s Marian devotion are forgotten, but that they just become less 
concentrated and overt. In the period that followed, however, James was busier than ever in 
fighting the infidel. Primarily he was engaged in the conquest of Valencia and later Murcia 
in the period 1232 - 1266. The conquest of the Kingdom of Valencia involved three military 
campaigns, each of them official crusades, conducted between 1232 and 1244 and a further 
protracted war against the Muslim rebel al-Azraq, which was also elevated to the status of a 
crusade. This did not conclude until 1258. 
Some Iberian historians, however, such as Vicente García Edo and Pierre Guichard, 
have been quite reluctant to concede the appellation of crusade to James’s Valencian 
campaigns and have cautiously put the term within quotation marks whenever referring to it 
to show this. Their argument is that James’s campaigns here were more wars ‘of national or 
political expansion’95 that were only crusades because ‘they bore that title on paper, that is 
to say as the result of papal bulls issued al respect and nothing more.’96 Pierre Guichard sees 
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the crusading aspect of the Valencian conquest as a single action coming late, subservient to 
its secular origins and not affecting its progress. This however, is to ignore the evidence of 
the continual, but intermittent, papal involvement and support that shall be detailed below. 
Burns strongly contests these claims, stating that ‘their misunderstanding derives from 
expecting crusades to be single large enterprises’. He adds that popes had ‘always 
encouraged the Spanish kings to crusade on their own borders, to their own self-interest and 
with their own resources, with no thought that this attitude diminished the crusading essence 
of the war.’97 The conquest of Valencia itself ‘involved not only a crusade but at least seven 
separate crusades.’98  
Again, however, though we hear all about the sieges and campaigns, one would not 
know these expeditions were crusades simply by reading the Llibre. A similar pattern also 
emerges regarding the joint Aragonese-Castilian venture to destroy rebel Moors in Murcia 
1264-66.99 We have very clear evidence, however, of the ecclesiastical assistance that James 
received. James initiated things by asking for papal support for his invasion of Northern 
Valencia in 1232. Pope Gregory IX was happy to acquiesce, sending to Aragon ‘the sign of 
the cross and conceding the remission of sins’.100 Later, to add impetus, on 9 August 1233 
the same pope encouraged the archbishops of Tarragona, Bordeaux, Auch and Narbonne to 
preach the crusade in their dioceses. This time, the indulgence granted was specifically 
equated with that conceded to crusaders to the Holy Land and fixed for a term of 3 years.101  
James’s progress in this period was, however, stymied by internal conflicts with the 
fiercely independent Aragonese baronage. The first example of this appears at the siege of 
Borriana, an important fortress in Northern Valencia. Things were not going to schedule and 
his uncle, the conservative Don Ferdinand, advised lifting the siege due to the paucity of 
currency and resources. James could not bring himself to countenance a course of action so 
damaging to his honour. He recalled how he would rather be injured by an arrow than retreat 
in dishonour.102 These struggles with the nobility were destabilising his crusading 
endeavours to such an extent that he felt compelled to ask the pope for help in taming his 
recalcitrant vassals. Gregory IX duly responded with a bull issued on 24 April 1235 that 
demanded peace in Aragon and for the nobles to renew the struggle against the Moors under 
James for another five years or suffer spiritual consequences. If necessary, he would even 
preach a crusade against the rebels themselves.103  
The Valencian crusade resumed in 1237 after James had taken the cross at a curia 
generalis at Monzón in front of the bishops of Tarragona, Barcelona, Zaragoza, Vich, 
Tortosa and Tarazona, but his enthusiasm was again dampened by the contrariness of his 
vassals.104 The conflict revolved around the strategic point of Puig de Cebolla. James was 
utterly determined to hold onto it, seeing it as vital for future conquest of Valencia itself; 
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while his nobles, who according to James were influenced primarily by their own economic 
interest, wished to abandon it for the time being.105 Don Blasco, advised withdrawal:  
 
‘…we see that you do not have such riches that you can sustain so great an enterprise 
as you have begun… For the more that place costs if the matter is not successful, the 
worse it will get for you and us.’106  
 
Here again, James looked to the Pope to intercede on his behalf and Gregory IX was once 
more happy to oblige.107 Thus, Gregory issued ecclesiastical censures to compel the nobles 
back into allegiance. He extended his protection to James until the ‘business of the cross’ 
was completed and threatened those who opposed him with excommunication and 
interdict.108 
It is most interesting to note here James’s robust employment of crusading ideology 
and imagery in his arguments with his vassals over their (as he perceived) erroneous strategy. 
The theme of his personal honour and glory is once more seamlessly tied in with the honour 
due to God. On the prospect of leaving the hill of El Puig James writes: ‘we feared two 
things: one that it would grieve God… the other, the shame of this world…’109 Later he 
admonishes his nobles for daring to put the state of their finances before the continuation of 
God’s work: ‘…we had not thought we would receive such advice from them, for what we 
did in the service of God.’110 It is also during these protracted arguments that James directly 
mentions for the first time an institutional practice of crusading – taking the cross. He 
reminds his vassals that they had ‘promised to help us when we held the Cort at Monzón and 
took the cross before us.’111  It seems, therefore, quite probable that James picks up the theme 
of Crusade again at El Puig in order to shame his nobles into action against the Moors there. 
By disobeying his will they were, by James’s assessment, also acting not just against their 
natural lord, but also contrary to the will of God, and he was utterly dismayed at the fact that 
they could not see it.  
James returns to the same tactic later when trying to convince his clergy at a Cort in 
Barcelona in 1264 to follow him in his unpopular policy of aiding the king of Castile against 
the Moorish rebels of Murcia. He asked them: ‘What will you gain if the churches where 
Our Lord and His mother are worshipped are lost through ill fortune, and Mahomet is 
worshipped there?’112 He continues, comparing God’s dominion to that of ‘kings’: ‘And if 
what belongs to we kings is lost, you can well understand that what is yours will not be 
restored…’113 Later that year at a Cort in Zaragoza James deployed the same argument to 
try to convince his reluctant nobles to aid him again in Murcia, claiming, with no evidence 
of papal authority, that they would do more good there than they could in Outremer:  
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‘..if we were to go to Outremer, we would not do a third part of the great mercy we 
do in defending what God has given to the king of Castile and to us.’114 
 
He then goes on to reveal the potential damage that these rebellions might do to his honour: 
‘…this is something from which we could receive shame and harm..’, before adding, ‘…if 
he [the king of Castile] loses his land, we could lose ours’, thus showing his cognisance as 
a strategist; but also, again, closely combining the subject of his own secular honour with 
the honour of God. 
For James, his vassals saw the expansion of the kingdom purely in terms of their own 
economic gains, this is juxtaposed with the way in which he portrays his own perception of 
things - for glory and for God. This is consistent with the feelings he expresses towards his 
nobles and knights throughout the Llibre.115 The early and late years of his reign were 
dominated by civil war and even during times of peace he enjoyed a fragile relationship with 
his Aragonese barons. It is little wonder, therefore, that he uses his chronicle to vent a little 
steam in this regard.  
The clearest indication of how the nobles fitted into James’s worldview can be 
gleaned from the somewhat patronising advice that he offered his son-in-law, King Alfonso 
X of Castile. James counsels him to try to retain all of the people under his lordship, but if 
he could only retain two then the Church and the common people were preferable to the 
knights.116 It can, therefore, be plausibly argued that in the times that James most strongly 
stresses the theme of crusade after Majorca, he does so in order to disgrace his nobles: to 
highlight their perfidy and to show that by disobeying his will, they were acting against 
nature. 
One discrepancy in the Llibre regarding James’s crusades is his treatment of his 
campaigns against the Valencian rebel al-Azraq (1247-1258). It is not just that he is reluctant 
to discuss the nature of these campaigns, but the fact that he barely discusses them at all that 
is interesting; and what he does tell us is also deliberately misleading. It took James eleven 
years to subdue the rebellion, but he devotes only fourteen short chapters to it in the Llibre.117 
Once more the papacy was forthcoming with aid and support, perhaps to a greater extent 
than ever before, but once again, one has to look beyond the Llibre to find this out. Pope 
Innocent IV launched a crusade against al-Azraq in November 1248 after James had 
petitioned him.118 Innocent also offered James financial aid through granting him a twentieth 
of all clerical rents in his lands for a year. Furthermore, he ordered the suspension of the 
collection of money owed to the Church for the protection of the Holy Land from within 
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James’s lands for three years, so that these resources could be used to fund the war against 
al-Azraq.119  
We can also tell, from the frequency and intensity of papal concern that the war 
against al-Azraq did not go well for much of its duration. A long letter from Pope Innocent 
IV to the archbishop of Tarragona dated 22 March 1250 highlights papal anxiety at the 
obviously fraught state of affairs in Valencia. It states that the pope felt ‘stabbed through by 
a spear’ to realise how the Muslims were, ‘persecuting’ the faith relentlessly, labouring ‘with 
their usual persecution in cruelty to extinguish it’ and to eliminate ‘its worshippers from the 
face of the earth. King James battles with tireless efforts in those regions against the aforesaid 
hosts, not sparing person and resources, an athlete for protecting the orthodox faith and for 
extending Christian worship.’ The pope then ordered the archbishop to preach the crusade, 
 
‘both by yourself and through other prudent and decent secular or religious clerics in 
order to rouse with frequent exhortations the faithful throughout Catalonia and the 
regions of Spain under the jurisdiction of the said king to battle against those hosts 
alongside the king.’ 
 
Innocent then confirmed ‘that the indulgence and privileges, which are granted to those 
rescuing the Holy Land on all the kings subjects who personally go with the king against 
these enemies.’120  
In all, Burns has compiled and documented no less than fifteen papal bulls addressing 
al-Azraq’s rebellion, thus highlighting the acuteness of the threat to James’s realms, and the 
crusading nature of his response.121 James says very little about this papal support, and 
indeed of the war itself, probably because it was messy, protracted and not without its fair 
share of set-backs – hardly the stuff of ‘great deeds’.122 What is interesting for this study, 
however, is James’s decision to expel all of the Muslims from Valencia in the wake of al-
Azraq’s rebellion; a policy contrary to his customary tolerance of his Muslim subjects, but 
perhaps explicable in the context of the rebellion.  
In January 1248 James swore to expel all of the Muslims of Valencia, even those 
who had not risen against him. He then has the bishop of Valencia respond by telling him 
that his name will be: ‘renowned in all of the world’ and that he could not ‘give greater joy 
to the Pope nor to the Church in Rome than by doing this.’123 James is quite misleading here, 
however, contrary to what he tells us in the Llibre there is little evidence of a concerted 
attempt to force a mass exodus of Muslims from the region in this period.124 Indeed, Burns 
argues that ‘though the crusaders, from the king down, had deployed fierce rhetoric… they 
had in fact gone to extraordinary lengths to retain in place every Islamic community and 
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Islamic farmer or craftsmen.’125 The reason for this was economic. The Aragonese had 
expanded too far and too fast; the prosperity of the new feudal lords of Valencia was utterly 
dependant on the maintenance of a large and skilled indigenous population.  
Under pressure from the papacy to deliver on his promise, however, James managed 
to persuade his prelates and cities to acquiesce somewhat, but, probably to his secret relief, 
his barons stood firm; for it was they who stood to lose the most from any expulsion of the 
Muslim population.126 Not only did this give James an excuse for failing to follow through 
with what would have been an ultimately ruinous policy, but it also allowed him to blame 
the baronage in the Llibre.  
‘Why does this [the expulsion of the Valencian Muslims] not please you? … you 
should not leave off from advising me according to God… for even though your 
revenue will be reduced, mark well how great is the mercy that you and I will do 
there.’127  
The obstinacy of his nobles provided the perfect excuse and opportunity to both 
uphold his reputation as a Christian champion by blaming them for the failure of the 
expulsion policy, and to preserve the economic vitality of his new kingdom by retaining its 
skilled population. This is certainly consistent with the recurring theme of James presenting 
himself as the valiant crusader king triumphing in spite of the machinations of his miserly 
Aragonese baronage. It is again to highlight this fact, and to exonerate James for failing in 
his promise to expel the Saracens from Valencia, that he stresses crusading ideology in these 
chapters. 
 
Planned Expeditions to Outremer 
 
The last important crusading theme developed in the Llibre is that of James’s desire 
to lead a successful expedition to Outremer.128 He has received criticism – both from 
contemporaries and historians – for failing to do so, and it was perhaps to justify his failure 
that he devotes a substantial portion of Llibre to this subject. According to O’Callaghan and 
Goñi Gaztambide, James first considered crusading in the Holy Land in the mid-1240s by 
responding favourably to the call of Pope Innocent IV at the Fourth Lateran Council in 
1245.129 He was however, thwarted by al-Azraq’s rebellion in 1247. James made a more 
concerted effort to go in 1268, however, and though he did not make it there himself, a 
portion of his expedition, including two of his sons, did.130  
After the conclusion of James’s Murcian Crusade in 1266 his hands were freed to 
answer the call of Pope Clement IV who was most anxious about the fate of the Holy Land 
after the rise to power of Sultan Baybars in Egypt.131 James I of Aragon, however, was 
probably the last Christian sovereign that he had in mind as his champion. In this period 
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James was criticised heavily by Pope Clement for living bigamously with his lover Doña 
Berenguera Alfonso of Castile.132 In order to marry Doña Berenguera, James had asked the 
pope to grant him a divorce from his wife, Teresa Gil de Vidaure; who he had falsely claimed 
had contracted leprosy. Clement rejected James’s request and rebuked him, saying that what 
he asked was: ‘contrary to God, abominable to the angles and monstrous to men.’133 Even 
when sending him felicitations (February 1266) for his crusading endeavours in Murcia, 
Clement still managed to turn his congratulatory message into a rebuke for his bigamy.134 
It is fascinating to note, that it is here that James makes his first and only overt 
reference to the possible direct spiritual benefits of his deeds for himself - the idea of crusade 
as penance, not just for sin, but for his sins specifically. Of his conquest of Murcia he wrote 
that he hoped that it would act as a counterweight to his sin of living bigamously with Doña 
Berenguera Alfonso. He stated that: '...we would serve God so well that day and in that 
conquest that He would pardon us,' and that, ‘...returning it [Murcia] to the Christians should 
count for us’135. In the eyes of Pope Clement IV, as we have seen, it did not.136 Indeed, the 
pope managed to chill James’s crusading fervour by informing him that: ‘I want you to know 
that the Crucified does not accept services from one who, soiled with an incestuous union is 
crucifying him anew.’137 Here, Burns argues, was the ‘first and only time that James’s 
balancing act of sins of flesh and good deeds went into disequilibrium.’ Conceivably, 
therefore, it is from a position of unique and fleeting self-doubt that James wished to place 
emphasis on the spiritual nature of his deeds. He sought to remind everyone, including 
himself, of the meritorious nature of his achievements as a counter-weight to his very public 
sins. ‘Fame versus shame were obviously and even obsessionally important to the 
conscience-stricken king.’138 
By January 1268, although still reluctant to preach a crusade to the Holy Land that 
involved James, Clement IV, due to the lack of interest from other quarters, found it 
necessary to seek his help.139 James attributed both his reasons for going and the failure of 
his expedition of 1269 to divine will. His interest was rekindled, he tells us, when he received 
a message from the ‘King of the Tartars’ via his kinsman Jaime Alaric.140 It suited his 
customary braggadocio to mention that: ‘they [the Mongols] had never sent a message of 
friendship to any Christian king except to us… if they had chosen to send a message only to 
us among all the others, it seemed a work of God… and since God wills it, we cannot receive 
harm.’ 141  
James set off from Barcelona on 4 September but his fleet encountered ‘a terrible 
storm from the East’, which apparently lasted for seventeen days, forcing his return. He tells 
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us how sailors who had made the journey to the Holy Land ‘twenty-five or twenty-six times 
had never seen such bad weather as that.’ Ultimately though he put down his failure to God’s 
will: ‘It appears that Our Lord does not will us to cross to Outremer.’142 Despite this eleven 
of his ships and two of his sons did make it to Acre where they achieved nothing of note.143  
James was condemned throughout Christendom for his failure. The continuer of the 
Chronicle of William of Tyre wrote that he endured: ‘great shame and great reproach’.144 Of 
his return, probably to repudiate such criticism and to reaffirm his commitment to crusade, 
James wrote: ‘We do not know what people will say, but Our Lord knows that we were 
forced here in this matter and that nothing in the world has ever grieved us as much or 
more.’145 Burns points out however, that he was very keen to provide his excuses: 'Poor 
James!’ He laments,  
 
‘No one believes him then, and no one believes him now. The truth seems that he 
was unable to break with his mistress to whom he returned, and the fear that God 
might be finally out of patience despite his service.’146  
 
This was certainly the opinion of many of his contemporaries. Smith concurs, citing the 
number of concessions of castles, towns and goods by James to Doña Berenguera at this 
time shows that she certainly was not far from his thoughts.147 It is also interesting to contrast 
James’s decision here with that of the young James forty years before at Majorca. The 
fledgling king had put his trust in God and the Virgin to protect him and his army, ordering 
his sailors to pass through the storm against their better judgement. 
Despite this, one cannot help but feel that James was right to feel hard done by by 
this criticism. He had at least shown a genuine and durable interest in crusading to the Holy 
Land, despite the fact that the Iberian rulers of the time were generally considered to have 
been exempt from this because of their more immediately pressing duty of combatting Islam 
at home. His actions in this regard compare favourably with those of his son-in-law, Alfonso 
X of Castile, who did not respond to the call of the pope in 1255 or 1268.148 Indeed, James 
had shown a greater interest in Outremer than any of his recent forebears, or for that matter, 
any king of Castile-Leon, who, Goñi Gaztambide comments, were not ‘seduced by the pull 
of the Holy Land’.149 Of his Iberian contemporaries only Theobald I & Theobald II of 
Navarre, who took part in the Crusade of 1239 and the Eighth Crusade in 1270 respectively, 
could claim a better pedigree with regards to commitment to the Holy Land.150 Even then, it 
must be remembered that Theobald I’s situation was very different from the kings of Aragon 
and Castile. He was in reality a French noble – he had been count of Champagne until 
inheriting Navarre in 1234 - and he was from a line of illustrious ancestors with an 
impeccable eastern crusading pedigree. His father had been elected leader of the Fourth 
Crusade, his grandfather had been on the Second Crusade and his uncle had been King of 
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Jerusalem. Also, Navarre did not border any Muslim state and therefore his opportunities to 
crusade in Iberia were limited when compared to Aragon and Castile. James, on the other 
hand, was from a line of famed Iberian crusaders. 
James thus stresses the theme of Crusade in the Llibre in the late 1260s for two 
reasons: firstly, to remind us, and himself, of his deeds as a counterweight to his great sin of 
living bigamously with Doña Berenguera Alfonso; and secondly, and perhaps more 
crucially, to justify his actions in not reaching the Holy Land and to remind his readers of 
his commitment to that most important endeavour. James returned to this theme one last time 
when he was invited by Pope Gregory X to attend the Second Council of Lyons (May 
1274).151 Here he again outlines his commitment to Outremer: ‘I will encourage those who 
have no desire to serve our Lord… and I will have much to say and do so much to achieve 
this.’152 He then goes on to outline a strategy to the assembled princes and prelates of what 
he perceived was the course of military action to take to aid the Holy Land pledging that he 
himself will go with 1,000 knights and financially support the venture with tithes.153 
James dedicates nineteen chapters of the Llibre to his meeting with the pope at Lyons 
– five more than he gives to his eleven years of war and crusade against al-Azraq. His 
motives here were certainly to promote his commitment to crusading in the East to erase the 
shame of 1269; but also because, he was quite in awe when meeting a pope for the first time 
and obviously wished for this meeting to be recorded sympathetically for posterity. At the 
Council of Lyons, James, at the ripe old age of sixty-six, campaign grizzled, at the height of 
his fame and brimming with self-confidence, met a pope for the first time in his life and, it 
seems, was somewhat star-struck by the experience. He was certainly very excited to receive 
confession from Gregory X: ‘because we have never seen a pope before you...’.154 Indeed, 
James retains a high degree of reverence throughout the Llibre for the office held by the 
heirs of St Peter. He shows particular admiration for Innocent III - who it must be 
remembered, instituted much of the crusading apparatus and impetus from which he 
benefited – saying of him that he ‘was the best Pope, so much so that from the time that we 
compose this book going back a hundred years there has not been so good a Pope in the 
Church of Rome.’155 This pope had been instrumental in securing the infant James’s release 
and return to Aragon from the clutches of Simon de Montfort in 1214156, so James’s 
appreciation is perhaps understandable here. The later entry at Lyon however, shows us that 
James’s high esteem extended beyond gratitude to a great man, to the office that he held. 
In summing up this chapter it is important to reiterate that it is most likely the case 
that James only once references the institutional mechanisms of crusading because such 
practices would have been clearly obvious to his audience – he did not need to spell it out 
each time that he took the cross or received a papal bull. It is nevertheless clear from the 
religious language and imagery that he uses throughout the Llibre that he felt that his deeds 
were divinely inspired and spiritually motivated.  
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It is however, in the description of his Majorcan campaign that he is most vigorous 
and concentrated in his employment of themes that we would associate with crusading, and 
his pages here are littered with its language. He strongly emphasises his Marian devotion, 
references possible celestial intervention and is more intense in relating his conquest to the 
will of God than at any other point. It is here too that James most overtly outlines arguably 
the most important theme of the Llibre – the seamless integration of his secular honour 
through conquest with the honour of God through crusade. It is perhaps because of the nature 
of the Majorcan conquest – a risky seaborne invasion which likened it somewhat to an 
eastern crusade – coupled with recollections of his youthful idealism, that James retold these 
deeds with a greater stress on the crusading ideal than he did for his later campaigns. 
After Majorca the most prominent reason for James placing emphasis on crusading 
seems to have been to contrast his commitment to God and good deeds with the worldly 
desires of his miserly barons. This theme is one which is developed through his Valencian 
campaigns 1232-44 and returned to when he discusses the joint Castilian and Aragonese 
Crusade against Murcia 1264-66. Similarly, the crusade against al-Azraq 1247-58 seems to 
have been mentioned to shame his nobles. James faced a barrage of criticism from the Papacy 
at this point for failing to follow through with his promise of expelling the Valencian 
Muslims. His barons’ refusal on economic grounds to enforce his will here allowed James 
to portray them as the main impediment to the successful execution of this policy. It was 
quite clear however, that James, for the same fiscal reasons espoused by his vassals, had no 
real desire to implement it in full himself. 
James returns to the theme of crusade when discussing his failure to campaign in the 
Holy Land. Heavily criticized for this by contemporaries, the Llibre seeks to offer an 
apologia for his actions in this regard. It was also immediately prior to James’s main attempt 
at going East in 1269 that he was under serious censure from Pope Clement IV for the sin of 
living bigamously with Doña Berenguera Alfonso. It was thus perhaps also from a position 
of unique self-doubt that James wished to place emphasis on the spiritual nature of his deeds 
here, hoping that they would ‘count’ for him.157 He needed to remind his audience, and 
perhaps himself, of the magnitude of his achievements as a counter-weight to his sins. Lastly, 
James highlights the issue of crusading for a final time when discussing his participation at 
the Second Council of Lyon 1274. Again he does this to remind us of his commitment to the 
Holy Sepulchre, but also because he seems to have been genuinely in awe of meeting a pope 
for the first time in his life and wished to provide a fitting record of this meeting for posterity. 
Therefore, though it can plausibly be argued that, at least in general terms, Iberian 
monarchs were more influenced by the evolving Iberian ideology of holy war than by 
crusade per se, this seems not to have been the case for James I of Aragon. International in 
outlook and in line with the greatest chivalric kings of the age, James was fully and deeply 
committed to the idea of crusade; his embarrassment at failing to reach the Holy Land is 
surely testament to the fact that he recognised its multi-national significance. Though at 
times he may have had ulterior motives for placing emphasis on this theme in the Llibre his 
commitment to prosecuting God’s will through feats of arms comes through genuinely. 
Where his worldly feats against the Moors enhanced his earthly renown and reputation, he 
also almost incessantly reminds us that in carrying out his deeds he was the conduit for God’s 
will on earth. To James it seems, there was no distinction: both constituted integral pillars of 
                                                          
157 CJI (426). 
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his perception of ‘chivalric kingship’. His spirituality was unique – he believed that he had 
a very personal relationship with God, and as Burns concludes ‘He was a sinner, yes; and he 
did mean to go to confession and to sort out his life; but as a spiritual man he had deeds to 
attend to; God understood.’158 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
158 Burns, ‘Spiritual Life’, p. 35. 
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3. The Llibre dels Fets and the Conduct of War: 
 
‘The nobles of Spain thoroughly understood warfare, as they constantly lived in it.’1 
 
Having analysed the influence of crusading on James’s campaigns we now turn to 
look at how, according to the Llibre, he was influenced by and adhered to contemporary 
laws of war, to ascertain what light the Llibre sheds on these evolving regulations and to 
determine how they marry with the chivalric purpose of the text.  
James’s chronicle is particularly important in light of the development and increasing 
sophistication of the laws which governed warfare in Iberia by the mid-thirteenth century. 
In an influential study, Elena Lourie presented the argument that warfare in Spain, and 
therefore its governing principles, evolved along a different trajectory from the rest of 
Christendom. This was largely due to the geopolitical factors of a centuries-old and ever-
fluctuating frontier with al-Andalus, and the militarised frontier societies that this 
engendered.2 Lourie argues that the type of warfare practiced by Christian kingdoms on the 
frontiers of Iberia came to bear a far greater resemblance to that employed by the Muslim 
societies which they mirrored than to their western co-religionists. She reasons that the 
Muslim tactics of the border fortification (ribat) and incessant frontier raiding were copied 
by the Christians to the extent that ‘the Reconquest can even be represented as essentially 
five long centuries of marauding raids’. As a result of this frontier raiding culture and the 
obvious requirements of speed and mobility to successfully prosecute it, a new class of 
commoner knight, the ‘caballero villano’ developed into one of the most important military 
classes in medieval Spain. These knights were privileged not because of their birth, but 
because they were useful; and they became ever more useful and numerous as the frontier 
ebbed southwards.3 The organisation, command, and discipline of such raids, moreover, 
received detailed attention in the statutes of the frontier towns.4 In both Muslim and Christian 
societies, ‘the practice of slavery was firmly established, and operated alongside the 
ransoming of prisoners, a convention facilitated by the comparatively developed monetary 
economy and urbanization.’5 
Differing greatly from the norms of Capetian and Plantagenet lands,  
 
‘entry into their ranks was solely the result of acquiring a horse, inheriting one or 
having it thrust upon you. And exit was just as casual. The un-replaced loss or sale 
of one's horse would reduce one to the ranks of the tax-paying infantry’.6  
 
                                                          
1 Siete Partidas, 2:27: (II) 
2 E. Lourie, 'Society Organized for War’, pp. 55- 75 
3 Lourie, 'Society Organized for War', p. 55 
4 Lourie, 'Society Organized for War', p. 68; James F. Powers goes into great detail in his analysis of these 
charters in his book of the same name. J. F. Powers, A Society Organized for War: the Iberian Municipal 
Militias in the Central Middle Ages, 1000-1284 (Berkley: 1988), pp. 162-187 
5 M. Strickland,  ’The Vanquished Body: Some Comparisons and Conclusions’, eds. M.I. Fierro & F. Garcia 
Fitz, 
El Cuerpo Derrotado: Cómo Trataban Musulmanes y Cristianos a los Enemigos Vencidos: Península Ibérica, 
ss. VIII-XIII (Madrid: Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas, 2008), p. 535  
6 Lourie, 'Society Organized for War', p. 58 
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Though there is much truth in these arguments, Lourie’s thesis is perhaps too 
sweeping and simplistic. After all, the prosecution of war in Iberia bore more similarities 
than differences to that practiced in Western Christendom. Reading the Llibre it is clear that 
battles were extremely rare (James fought only two) and that sieges were common and they 
were almost always preceded by marauding raids of enemy territory - a pattern of war that 
essentially mirrored practice in the Anglo-Norman and French world.7 We can also draw 
parallels between the citizen militias of Iberia and their French or Italian counterparts, and 
with the caballeros villanos and the French mounted sergeants-at-arms. John France argues 
that in France, 
 
‘The communal movement, there [in France] as elsewhere, was an armed movement 
in which… city dwellers must have been clearly aware of the need to defend 
themselves against those from without the walls.’8 
 
Indeed, one might also describe the fractured world of eleventh century France as a ‘society 
permanently organised for war’. There was certainly perpetual fighting, but the difference it 
seems lay in the organisation and recorded regulation, as warfare in Iberia became regulated 
in a most sophisticated and unparalleled manner.9 This was not just because of a permanent 
military frontier as, after all, the Noman Vexin was also a permanent military frontier for 
nearly two centuries and we do not witness the same level of regulation there. The frontier 
between Christian Iberia and al-Andalus was unique in duration, but more importantly, it 
was cross-cultural and this better explains developments there.  
Elaborate rules were drawn up for the recruitment, discipline, indemnification for 
losses and wounds received, intelligence and counter-intelligence when on the march and 
above all - the subject of the most meticulous regulations - the division of the spoils.10 It is 
within this context that the Llibre will be examined to shed light upon the nature of the laws 
of war regarding the division of spoils and the treatment of the vanquished. 
 
Conduct of War: the division of spoils and treatment of the vanquished 
 
‘Gain is something which all men naturally desire to secure, and especially those 
 who engage in war; first, on account of the expense which they incur; second,  
because they expose themselves to great dangers on account of it.’11 
 
Though the Llibre is rich in providing us with practical examples with which we can 
flesh out Alfonso X’s theoretical and legalistic dictums on the conduct of war, there are 
perhaps none as precise and informative as James’s description of an incident involving the 
arrival of two ships, during the preliminary stages of the siege of Borriana.12 ‘Meanwhile 
two galleys arrived from Tarragona’, James begins his narrative,  
                                                          
7 For a detailed analysis of the prosecution of western warfare in the period see France, Western Warfare, 
pp. 1-166; For its regulation and conduct see Strickland, War and Chivalry. 
8 France, Western Warfare, p. 63 
9 Powers, A Society Organized for War 
10 Lourie, 'Society Organized for War', p. 69 
11 Siete Partidas, 2: (26) 
12 CJI (164) 
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‘one belonging to Bernat Santaeugénia, the other to Pere Martell. We did not have 
any galley, and feared the king of Valencia might arm two or three galleys to attack 
the provisions that came from Tarragona and Tortosa. And the sailors and those who 
were wise in matters of the sea advised us that we should retain those galleys and on 
no account allow them to leave.’13  
 
James’s description of what followed reveals to us not only the limitations of his own 
authority over the free-men of his realm, but also the paramount importance of material 
reward in holding together the society in which he lived. Despite James’s pleas – ‘we 
besought them in every way possible’ - to the honour of Bernat Santaeugénia (a noble) and 
the good will of Pere Martel, a ‘good townsman’, that they give up their vessels for the king’s 
use in the siege, they steadfastly refused until James agreed to pay them ‘sixty thousand 
sous’.14  
What James records himself to have said at this juncture is most illuminating, not 
least because of the recurrence of one of his favourite fictions, the idea that he had no 
previous history of disappointment in Valencia.15  The fact that he failed to take Peñíscola 
in 1224 once again slips from his recollection here. He also returns to the theme of collective 
aggrandisement. By handing over their ships, Bernat and Pere would aid their lord in his 
success and thus share in his glory. By not doing so they would aid his enemies and share 
his shame. James begged them,  
 
‘you must always look to my honour I ask you, for God, and because you are my 
subjects, not to wish me such great harm and dishonour’. 
 
Here again, he equates the potential success of his own fortunes with the glory of God.16  
Bernat and Pere, however, remained unmoved and held out for material 
compensation. Despite the chivalric nature of the text, James had to attempt to appeal not 
just to his subjects’ sense of honour, but also to their avarice to secure their acquiescence 
with his wishes. This fusion of honour and material gain is a theme taken up by the Siete 
Partidas, which sums up this carrot-and-stick approach succinctly: the extraordinary act 
merits a reward for the valorous individual, but the brave deed is often a matter of 
opportunity. This opportunity, if seized, merited a reward but similarly deserved punishment 
if unjustifiably shunned.17   
From here, however, things only become more complex and ultimately revealing; for 
James simply did not have the means to pay these merchants what they desired ‘then and 
                                                          
13 CJI (163); Pere Martell was a member of the Barcelona merchant class and Bernat Santaeugénia a Catalan 
magnate, both were involved in the Majorca expedition and had been well rewarded there. Codex Catalá 
del Llibre del Repartiment de Mallorca, ed. Ricard Soto Company (Mallorca: Conselleria d’Educació, 1984), 
3r, 25v, 30v, 55r, 55v. 
14 CJI (164). 
15 ‘Let us leave aside the harm and dishonour I and all my army would receive… this is the first place I have 
besieged in the kingdom of Valencia. And for me to leave here? I would not do it’. CJI (164) 
16 (164 - 165). 
17 Siete Partidas, 2:27: (2). 
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there’, instead only being able to offer a paltry ‘one thousand sous’.18 He then tells us that 
he offered them pledges, but that they would not accept these if he did not include as surety 
the masters of the Temple and the Hospital.19 However, as one might expect of men of their 
time, place and exalted station, the masters of the foremost military orders of the kingdom 
were unwilling to play the part of pawns in this game, unless of course, their own interests 
were also buttressed by the king. Roman Patot, the master of the Temple, suggested the 
compromise that if James confirmed ‘in charters and privileges’ all that they held from the 
king, he and the master of the Hospital would act as surety for him in his dealings with the 
Catalan traders.20 And so James reluctantly agreed, got his two ships in the end and the siege 
of Borriana was ultimately successful.21  
It is, however, the obstacles through which he had to navigate that are most 
interesting to us. They disclose that the foundations of thirteenth century Iberian society 
rested not just upon the knightly principles of honour through prowess, as it seems James 
would wish us to believe, but also on the potential for individual advancement and material 
gain, and that the two were not mutually exclusive. The extract is also telling in that it shows 
that the security of James’s own royal authority rested in part on his ability to facilitate this 
for his vassals.22 The near contemporary Poem of the Cid concurs that a commander’s hold 
on power was inextricably linked to his ability to aggrandise his followers: ‘Those who serve 
a good master are always well off’. It may, though, have been more hopeful of James 
appealing in these terms to Bernat Santaeugénia than Pere Martell; being a merchant and not 
a knight Pere was not bound by the same codes of conduct that Bernat would have been. 
Indeed, James seems to recognise this distinction when addressing the pair, reserving the 
adjective of ‘honourable’ solely for Bernat.  
The fact remains here, however, that irrespective of the differing nature of such 
relationships, it is obvious that neither permitted James to commandeer these ships without 
consent, and that consent required significant compensation.  This is much removed from 
the draconian methods employed by James’s near contemporary, King John of England, 
when he too needed to appropriate ships to fight a foreign power in 1208. In John’s case, the 
enemy was Philip Augustus of France, and he seems to have made no appeals to the honour 
or the good will of his subjects as he instructed the men of all maritime districts to have their 
ships ready to sail from Portsmouth on 1 June. Any vessels that were not provided 
                                                          
18 He even considered ‘pawning’ some of his horses to raise the capital, but reasoned ‘now is not the time 
for pawning horses’. CJI (165). 
19 CJI (165). 
20 CJI (165); this is another example of where we can prove James to be as good as his word in the Llibre 
through analysis of crown documents. Charters that he issued at Borriana confirm that both the Hospitallers 
and the Templars were compensated in the manner that he suggests they would be in the text. At Borriana 
on 15 June 1233 he confirmed all the privileges of the Hospitallers granted by his predecessors. DJI, 1: (182). 
Then, in a charter dated 22 June 1233, he conceded to the Templars the castle of Xivert and a portion of the 
town of Borriana: ‘we give [donamus] to you, master of the order of the Temple, and your brothers, the castle 
which is called ‘Xuverth’ [Xivert] in the land of the Saracens’. DJI, 1: (183); finally in a charter, again from 
Borriana, dated 25 July, James granted a section of the town [quandam partem ville de Burriana] which he 
had newly conquered [noviter acquisite]. DJI, 1: (185).  
21 Between 15-22 July 1233. Miret, Itinerari, p. 105. 
22 Poem of the Cid, (74); The ability of the Cid to aggrandize his followers is perhaps the paramount theme 
of the poem – see referenced examples. Poem of the Cid, (25, 40, 45, 68); later in the Llibre James even tells 
us of a knight who comes to him ‘with good news’ and asks for a reward for his trouble. James tells him that 
he ‘will give him a reward according to the [nature of] the news that he brought. CJI (193). 
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voluntarily were to be seized and dire consequences threatened for disobedience. Indeed, 
Gervase of Canterbury tells us that several men of the Cinque Ports were ‘hanged and others 
put to the sword.’23 
The division of the spoils of war was the subject of the most meticulous regulations.24 
Such spoils ranged from endowment of an estate to a great magnate, trade concessions to a 
merchant, to a share of booty gained on campaign ‘in the form of cattle, slaves, moveables 
and even food-stuffs’ to all those who participated.25 Along with Alfonso’s Siete Partidas 
we have much documentary evidence in the case of town fueros, furs and cartas pueblas, 
which specify the exact nature of who should expect what reward and why.26  
By the twelfth century large collections of municipal regulations for warfare were 
gathered into charters, which were awarded to a series of towns in a manuscript grouping 
often referred to as a ‘family’.27 Indeed, these groups of related charters or ‘families’ antedate 
the Siete Partidas by at least a century and must have provided a legal basis for much of 
Alfonso’s dictats. The Cuenca-Teruel ‘family’, for example, was the first to describe the 
system which had evolved for the division of booty, to be followed by the Coria Cima-Coa 
charters from Leonese Extremadura shortly thereafter.28 Alfonso X gives us an insight into 
the contemporary rationale behind this increasingly complex system of laws governing the 
spoils of war:  
 
‘where property that is obtained by conquest is appropriated according to justice, two 
advantages result from it; first, it prevents discord from arising among men; and 
second, it enables them to be paid with what is in their possession.’  
 
He continues, saying that this rule should especially be followed in war as men have suffered 
hardships ‘which give them reason to think that they are entitled to a liberal share, and this 
is eminently just.’29  ‘The hope of booty did more than secure men and equipment for the 
battlefield, however; it also gave them the incentive to excel’ and is therefore intrinsically 
linked with the underlying theme of honour through prowess in war.30 Booty constituted the 
chief enticement – beyond reputation – to act honourably under such conditions. From the 
                                                          
23 The Historical Works of Gervase of Canterbury, ed. W. Stubbs, 2 vols. (London, Longman’s & Co., 1880), 2: 
(101-2); M. Morris, King John: Treachery, Tyranny and the Road to Magna Carta (London: Hutchinson, 
2015), p. 171. 
24 For a detailed account of the precise nature of such rules and indemnities that are not discussed 
forthwith in this chapter see: Siete Partidas, 2:23-30; Lourie, 'Society Organized for War', Powers, ‘Society 
Organized for War’, pp. 162-183. 
25 Lourie, 'Society Organized for War', p. 69. 
26 J. F. Powers, ‘Two Warrior Kings and their Municipal Militias: The Townsman-Soldier in Law and Life’, ed. 
R. I Burns, The Worlds of Alfonso the Learned and James the Conqueror (Los Angeles: The Center for 
Medieval and Renaissance Studies, University of California, 1985), p. 97. 
27 Scholars of medieval Iberia have grouped together related groups of municipal town charters granted to 
the towns in Aragon, Castile, Leon, and Portugal, calling these groups families. To do this they compare the 
military law established in such charters and then identify the identical or nearly identical components of 
the laws granted to particular towns, and thus group the municipal charters with such similar laws into 
families. One famous example is the Cuenca-Teruel family of charters. Powers, Society Organized for War, 
p. 10. 
28 Powers, Society Organized for War, p. 165. 
29 Siete Partidas, 2:26: (27). 
30 Powers, Society Organized for War, p. 177. 
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beginning of a campaign to its conclusion, those who had rendered special service could 
expect due repayment from the booty taken on that campaign.31  
Such documents, along with the Siete Partidas, therefore, can be used to help us 
contextualise what light the Llibre sheds on the nature and practice of the division of the 
spoils of war in this period. James’s two major campaigns – Majorca and Valencia – and 
what they tell us about the division of lands amongst the greater magnates will be analysed 
first, before our focus shifts to moveables and raids, and lastly to surrender terms and the 
treatment of the vanquished. 
 
Division of lands and immoveable property 
 
What the Llibre tells us about the division of lands regarding the conquest of Majorca 
is important, not least because it was carried out almost entirely by James’s Catalan subjects. 
There is much less evidence, in terms of extant municipal charters, for the development of 
sophisticated laws governing war in Cataluña than there is from the kingdom of Aragon.32 
This is not to say that similar practices were not followed there, just that their legal 
implications have been left largely unrecorded.33 Nevertheless, the text provides some 
pertinent examples which seem consistent with the Castilian-Aragonese charters and the 
laws of the Siete Partidas. 
The first reason that James gives for the invasion of Majorca is so that he and his 
vassals might increase their ‘worth’ (renown).34 The implication here is that they may 
increase their status and material wealth. This can be deduced in part from the fact that it is, 
according to James, the Barcelona merchant Pere Martell who first suggests Majorca as a 
potential conquest. Smith argues that Pere’s presence in this chapter is to remind the reader 
that a commercial push from Catalan burghers were perhaps as important as dynastic 
ambition in motivating the expedition.35 Belenguer concurs, emphasising the mercantile 
interests of Barcelona as the driving force behind the Majorca expedition.36 Indeed, Martell 
and others like him did very well out of its conquest.37 
Later when describing the Cort at Barcelona in December 1228 James addressed for 
the first time the potential division of spoils that a successful invasion of Majorca might 
yield.38 He tells us that the assembled nobles suggested that he should prepare a charter 
‘according to which the division of lands and moveable goods that we gained with them 
would be agreed.’39 It was decided that according to the resources (‘knights, armed men, 
ships, galleys, vessels and the armament that would go in them’) provided for the expedition 
                                                          
31 Powers, Society Organized for War, p. 177. 
32 Powers notes that though there is evidence for the growth of a military militia tradition in upper Ebro 
valley, it was customary for the counts of Barcelona to rely upon a more typically feudal military 
establishment, which was slow to draw on towns as a military resource. Powers, ‘Two Warrior Kings’, p. 97. 
33 Powers, Society Organized for War, p. 63. 
34 CJI (47). 
35 Smith & Buffery (eds.), The Book of Deeds, p. 69. 
36 Belenguer, Jaime I, pp. 85-86. 
37 Pere Martell clearly served the king well in this expedition as he was generously rewarded in the 
Repartiment de Mallorca. Codex Catalá del Llibre del Repartiment de Mallorca, ed. Ricard Soto Company 
(Mallorca: Conselleria d’Educació, 1984), (3r, 30v, 55r, 55v). 
38 The dates of charters and documents issued by James tell us that he was in Barcelona from at least 19 to 
30 December 1228. DJI, 1: (109 – 115). 
39 CJI (55). 
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James would compensate each man accordingly so long as they served him ‘loyally’, thus 
again links the prospect of material reward with preserved honour.40 James’s words here can 
be confirmed by charters issued from the Cort, one stating that ‘we will give you a just share 
according to the number of soldiers and armed men which you bring with you.’41 This seems 
to be in keeping with the emerging common practice of the period and is consistent with the 
maxims of Alfonso X who stated that the division of booty ‘should be made according to the 
number of men, arms and armour and horses, which those composing the army or foraging 
party bring with them.’42 
The division of Majorca is well documented in both archival sources (the liber de 
repartiment) and in secondary literature. From this we can deduce that James was more or 
less as good as his word regarding the nature of the division, and also obtain an interesting 
insight into the dual nature of the societies of his realms: it seems that James was content to 
follow the Iberian model whereas the great magnates of Cataluña divided their portions as 
feudalities along the French model.43  The island was essentially divided up into eight parts, 
four of which reverted to the king and four to the greatest magnates.44 Once again it is 
revealing to observe here that the Llibre is proved correct in its detail as during a dispute 
with his barons over land at Majorca James tells us ‘we have half of the land’.45 Each part 
was then divided up into caballerias46 (shares) which were distributed by James according 
to the amount of soldiers, equipment and provisions brought by the magnates, prelates, 
militias and military orders. According to Alan Forey the total amount of caballerias was 
nearly 13,450, with the largest single assessment going to the king, who was rated at 5,674½ 
caballerías; the next largest going to Nuyo Sanc, Gastoneto de Moncada, the bishop of 
Barcelona, and the count of Ampurias in that order.47 The Templars received the fifth largest 
share of 525½ caballerías, just under a twenty-fifth of the whole.48 This is interesting as it 
shows James breaking with the promise of his great-grandfather, count Ramon Berenguer 
                                                          
40 CJI (55). 
41 ‘We will give you a just share according to the number of soldiers and armed men which you bring with 
you.’ The rest of this charter concerns just what these potential spoils will be: ‘states’,  ‘castles’, ‘houses’,  
‘lands deserted and inhabited’, ‘with their rents and possessions, movable and fixed’. DJI, 1: (113).  
42 Siete Partidas, 2:26: (28). 
43 It is interesting to note here that in the contemporaneous Poem of the Cid the Catalans under Roman 
Berenguer IV are referred to as Franks ‘Los Francos’. Poem of the Cid, (58). 
44 Colección de documentos inéditos del archivo general de la Corona de Aragon, ed. P. de Bofarull y 
Mascaró et al., 42 vols. (Barcelona, 1847-1973), 11: (116); A. J. Forey, The Templars in the Corona de 
Aragon, (Durham: 1973), pp. 32-33; Belenguer, Jaime I, p. 111. 
45 CJI (96). 
46 Alfonso X tells us that because ‘it was suggestive of warlike deeds, they [the ancients] gave the name 
caballeria, to the portion of the booty to which each [man] was entitled.’ Siete Partidas, 2:26: (28) 
47 Both Bernat de Santaeugénia and Pere Martell (the men that James needed to barter with to obtain their 
ships at Borriana in 1233) were well rewarded in the repartiment of Majorca. Bernat received 254 
caballerias making him a substantial landholder. Codex, 25v. Pere Martell received 40 caballerias, 5 jovadas 
and other concessions and privileges including farmsteads. Codex, 3r, 30v, 55r, 55v; According to Ricard 
Soto and Antonio Mas, one jovada (or jovate) was the equivalent of 16 acres. R. Soto & A. Mas, ‘Els 
Repartiment De Mallorca: Diversitat De Fonts I D’Interpretaciones Metrologiques’, ed. E. Guinot & J. Torró, 
Repartiments a la Corona D’Aragó: Segles XII – XIII (Valencia: University of Valencia, 2007) pp. 82-83  
48 For a record these donations of cabalerias see the Codex Catalá del Llibre del Repartiment de Mallorca: 
for king James: 4v/5r, 8r, 9r, 10v, 12r, 12v, 15v, 17v, 24v, 26v, 27r, 27v, 28r, 28v, 29r/29v, 30r, 34v, 39r/40v, 
41r/41v, 41v/45r, 49r/50r, 52v/54r, 55v/56r, 57/59v, 60/61v, 62v, 63/65v, 67v/68r, 71r, 71/73r, 74v/75r, 
75v, 76r, 78v, 81v, 82r, 82v/83v, 85r/85v, 86r, 87v/88v, 90r. For Nunyo Sanc: 25r, 26v, 27r, 27v, 29r, 
34v/35v, 45v, 48r/48v, 83v, 86r, 86v/87r, 88v/89r, 89v. For Gastonet de Montcada: 25r, 27r, 28v. For the 
bishop of Barcelona: 25r, 27r, 27v, 28r, 28v, 29r, 29v, 30r, 36v, 83v. Codex; CDI 11, (3 – 6). 
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IV in 1143 that the Templars be rewarded with one fifth of all future conquests by the counts 
of Barcelona in Iberia.49 James’s decision not to honour this, however, was both pragmatic 
and consistent with the spirit of the time, whereby magnates and militias were compensated 
according to their status and the size of their forces.50 
How James divided and organised his half share of the island in comparison with 
what the great Cataluñan magnates did with the other four parts is also of interest. Despite 
the fact that James could draw little upon the interior citizen militias of upper Aragon for the 
conquest of Majorca, he was able to draw upon substantial militia, and more importantly, 
naval forces from the coastal towns of Tarragona, Girona, Marseilles and Barcelona.51 
Guillem Rosselló Bordoy has shown that these townsmen were rewarded for their service 
with lands from James’s share, ranging from the smallest contribution, coming from 
Zaragoza, which received 2.5 caballerias, to the largest, Barcelona and Marseilles, which 
received 876 and 637 caballerias respectively.52 In total, Belenguer notes, James distributed 
13,647 hectares and a third of the houses in the city of Majorca to the urban communities of 
Cataluña and Occitania that had aided the conquest. They were also afforded freedom of 
taxes, with the exception of the tithe in recognition of the king’s sovereignty.53 He argues 
further that this contrasted with the conduct of the magnates who distributed land as 
feudalities to other lesser knights who had participated in the conquest. These feudalities 
were then tithed a tenth part of their harvest and were obliged to perform knights’ service 
with barded horses (prestar caballo armado).54 
Though it was most likely for pragmatic reasons, relating to the size of the 
contingents his vassals and militias might bring on future campaigns, that James promoted 
the principle that their reward should be proportional to their commitment, it is also perhaps 
indicative of his pragmatism that the one time that he broke with this maxim at Majorca was 
a calculated decision ultimately taken to safeguard his future interests. The Hospitallers had 
arrived too late to take part in the expedition but petitioned the king to give them some land.55 
James recalls that he was very well disposed to Hugh de Forcalquier whom he had made 
‘master [of the Hospital] in our land… he was a man we loved very much.’56 Hugh told 
James that he feared dishonour for his brothers if it was assumed that they had not taken part 
in such a good deed as the conquest of Majorca. James promised to satisfy his honour 
‘willingly and gladly’, but admitted that this would not be easy as the land had already been 
                                                          
49 In all count Ramon Berenguer IV’s compact with the Templars gave them: the castles of Monzón, 
Mongay, Barbará, Chalamera, Belchite, and Remolins and royal rights in Corbins; a tenth of royal revenues 
and in addition 1,000s annually from royal dues both in Zaragoza and in Huesca; a fifth of all future lands 
conquered from the Moors; and exemption from certain taxes. CDI, 4: (43). 
50 The repartimiento of Seville after its capture by Fernando III in November 1248 followed a similar pattern; 
Repartimiento de Sevilla, 2 vols., ed. J. Gonzáles  (Madrid: CSIC, 1951); Powers, Society Organized for War, 
p. 107. 
51 Powers, Society Organized for War, p. 51. 
52 These figures are taken from transcription of the latin codex of Majorca Cathedral dated 5 September 
1307 published by Guillem Rossello Bordoy in 2006. G. Rossello Bordoy, ‘Mallorca 1232: Colectivos Urbanos, 
Órdenes Militares y Reparto del Botín’, Aragon en la Edad Media, 19 (Zaragoza: Uniniversidad de Zaragoza, 
2006), pp. 461-465; they can, however, also all be located on the same page of the Codex Catalá del Llibre 
del Repartiment de Mallorca. Codex, 31r. 
53 Belenguer, Jaime I, p. 112. 
54 Belenguer, Jaime I, pp. 112-113. 
55 CJI (95). 
56 CJI (95). 
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divided and some of the recipients had returned home.57 However, he found his assembled 
magnates ‘very ill-disposed’ to compensating the Hospitallers who had not contributed 
anything to the conquest.58 James assuaged their fears by promising that any remuneration 
for the Hospitallers would come out of his own share. His reasons here, as he describes them, 
were purely practical, for of Hugh de Forcalquier and his order he says ‘it is not a good idea 
to get on the wrong side of a man such as this and an order such as this.’59 James, therefore, 
coolly and rationally weighed up the pros and cons of either maintaining a principle that it 
was perhaps in his interests to uphold, but was becoming accepted practice anyway, or losing 
the support of a powerful international order. He wisely chose the former. We witness again 
here another instance where the chivalric opposites of honour and shame are linked with 
material reward.  
This incident is also useful, however, as it allows us to tentatively ascertain how 
much a share of land was worth in relation to the number of knights brought on campaign. 
James tells us that his nobles agreed that the Hospitallers would be given a share 
‘corresponding to thirty knights’, which was ‘the same share as the Temple’.60 Therefore, if 
we take their final share of 301 caballerias61 we can perhaps deduce that one knight equated 
to 10 caballerias. Unfortunately however, the Llibre cannot be fully trusted in this instance 
as the figures show that the Templars actually received a significantly larger share than the 
Hospitallers (525.5 caballerias), not the same amount as claimed by James.62 
By the middle of the twelfth century it had become a common practice among 
Christian rulers in Spain to anticipate conquests from the Moors and to make grants of 
territory which still lay in Moorish hands.63 It is clear that this was the case regarding the 
division of Valencia. Indeed, in the immediate aftermath of the conquest James makes 
explicit reference that prior division had occurred: ‘we examined the charters detailing the 
donations we had made.’64 Belenguer, however, talks here of a complicated drawn out and 
evolving process of division, whereby there were essentially three books of repatriment, or 
three stages in which the division of lands were recorded, representing the changing realities 
of who actually held the land.65 He states further that James created the first document that 
exists concerning these books when camped at the foot of El Puig in June 1237 as a means 
to attract volunteers to his small army there.66 In it donations were made in the abstract before 
                                                          
57 CJI (95). 
58 CJI (96). 
59 CJI (96). 
60 CJI (97). 
61 Rossello Bordoy, ‘Collectivos Urbanos’, p. 464; codex, 1r, 2r, 3r, 8v, 22r, 25v, 26r. 
62 Rossello Bordoy, ‘Collectivos Urbanos’, p. 464; codex, 3r/3v, 5r, 8v, 24v. 
63 Forey, Templars, p. 24; examples of the development of this custom can be taken from promises made 
regarding Tortosa: Raymond Berenguer III had promised the city to Artal, count of Pallars; Alfonso I stated 
in his will that if he captured it he would give it to the Hospitallers, CDI 6: (2); in 1136 Raymond Berenguer 
IV gave it in fee to William of Montpellier, who ten years later left it to his son, CDI (IV. 53-4, doc. 220);  in 
1146 the count of Barcelona granted the lordship of the city, together with the castle called the Zuda and a 
third of the city's revenues, to the seneschal William Raymond of Moncada; CDI 4: (51); and at about the 
same time the Genoese were assigned a third of the city by the count. CDI 4: (141). After the capture of 
Tortosa only the last two of these grants were taken into consideration. 
64 CJI (284). 
65 Belenguer, Jaime I, pp. 140-142. 
66 Belenguer, Jaime I, p. 140; Evidence from the Liber del Repartiment de Valencia confirms this as there are 
over 100 donations of obviously as yet unconquered land recorded for the year 1237. Libre del Repartiment 
del Regne de Valencia, ed. M. Cabanes Pecourt & R. Ferrer Navarro (Zaragoza: Anubar, 1979), 1: (1-107). 
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Valencia had been conquered. Therefore, once it was conquered and many of James’s army 
did not want to settle in the city or within its jurisdiction, the original book was obsolete, as 
many of the original inheritors had sold their benefices to others who would arrive much 
later before even obtaining them themselves. More than one hundred of the names of the 
first beneficiaries had not taken possession of their concessions in the aftermath of the 
conquest.67 A further reason given by Belenguer for the practice of prior division was that it 
helped to prevent uncontrolled looting once a town fell.68 
 In its description of the division of Valencia the Llibre is valuable for several 
reasons. It again emphasizes the dual nature of James’s realm. On the third day after the 
conquest, James tells us, he set about dividing the houses with the archbishop of Narbonne 
and the great magnates and clerics. He then goes on to specify that he also gave portions to 
the ‘corporations of the cities [citizens militias], each according to the company and the men-
at-arms they had sent’.69 This is confirmed by the Libre del Repartiment, which tells us that 
the citizens of both the towns of Aragon and of Cataluña were well rewarded.70 The fact that 
James acknowledges them alongside the magnates and prelates also highlights their 
significance.  
It is however, what the Llibre tells us regarding the potential pitfalls of prior division 
that is most interesting. James states that once his partitioners had set about the task of 
dividing up the land of Valencia it quickly became apparent that he had made more donations 
than there was land available to give. He was of course quick to cast off the blame here, 
citing ‘trickery’ for the mistake, obviously to preserve his honour.71 He then tried to appoint 
two of his household who were versed in law to act as partitioners.72 The barons were not 
happy with this decision, wishing instead that the dividers came from their own ranks: ‘for 
though they may be good and well versed in the law, it does not pertain to them to divide it. 
Rather you should appoint the most honourable men that you have here.’73  
This incident is symptomatic of one of the key themes of the Llibre; the tension 
between crown and magnate. Indeed, Smith argues that during this period there was a great 
surge in scholars from Cataluña going to Bologna to study law, which in turn greatly 
increased its adoption in their homeland on their return. Roman law tended to strengthen the 
position of the king in relation to pre-existing feudal custom. The fact that James portrays 
his nobles here and at other times to be distrustful of lawyers is just one facet of his wider 
theme of portraying then as untrustworthy in general.74 Burns similarly argues that James 
was able to use the recently conquered Valencia as a ‘lever in his struggle to rise from feudal 
suzerain to Roman-law king’.75  
The barons, however, got their way regarding the partitioners, who were ultimately 
selected from within their ranks – ‘two nobles and two bishops’.76 James’s version of what 
                                                          
67 Belenguer, Jaime I, p. 141. 
68 ‘The first book was to prevent dire feudal consequences’ is my direct translation of Belenguer’s Castilian. 
Belenguer, Jaimie I, p. 141. 
69 CJI (284). 
70 Libre del Repartiment, 1: (17-72, 323-435). 
71 CJI (285). 
72 Don Assalit de Gúdar and Don Jimeno Pérez de Tarazona (his Steward in Aragon). CJI (286). 
73 CJI (286). 
74 Smith & Buffery (eds.), The Book of Deeds, p. 58. 
75 Burns, Medieval Colonialism’, p. 15. 
76 CJI (286). 
54 
 
happened next succinctly encapsulates several key themes: honour and shame, the perfidious 
incompetence of his vassals, and James’s inflated opinion of his own abilities - in this case 
his cunning. When he told his lawyers that he had agreed with the nobles’ plan for the 
division they were distraught and plead with him not to go through with it as ‘[they] would 
receive dishonour’. James then took a self-satisfied tone in telling them that ‘they are not 
thinking straight’, and that they should leave matters to him as he will ‘protect them from 
dishonour’. He proceeded to explain to them his cunning plan of letting the barons try to 
divide the land in the knowledge that they would fail and have to return it to him and allow 
his lawyers to do it. And this, according to James, is exactly how things proceeded.77  
Obviously we cannot take James’s word verbatim here, but we do know that there 
were problems with the division of land that continued into 1240, to the extent that the whole 
process was revised. As Belenguer notes, a meeting of the king’s advisors proposed to 
‘reduce the extent of the donations and readjust completely the repartiment,’78 with the 
revised book dividing the city into Barrios (areas) according to the origins of the settlers.79 
This seems to tie in with James’s last words to his partitioners on the matter: ‘you shall 
reduce the jovate to six cafizes [from 12 to 6]’.80 Powers agrees, stating that substantial 
Barrios were awarded to the towns of Aragon and Cataluña, but the repartiment did not 
really happen as recorded in the Liber del repartiment as many who were given concessions 
simply did not arrive to take them.81 This fact is confirmed by documentary evidence as on 
17 June 1240 James issued a proclamation from Xátiva where he reserved the right to claim 
the benefices of those who had not arrived to take them up and ‘do as he pleased with them, 
despite what the charter said.’82 From the same document we can also infer that James was 
becoming frustrated with the evolving nature of the repartiment as he stated that this division 
in 1240 should be ‘perpetual, valid forever and ultimate.’83 As a result of this Belenguer 
concludes that repartiment of Valencia, as represented in the Liber, did not represent a 
permanent reality, but a reflection of a moment for the city corresponding to 1238-1240.84 
Regarding the division of lands and imoveable property, we can thus observe two 
crucial themes from the Llibre: a very pragmatic approach to division from King James and 
a commitment to preserving the link between material reward and preserved honour. From 
the division of Majorca we have seen that James, undoubtedly for practical reasons 
concerning future campaigns, strove to uphold the principle of proportional reward. Yet 
equally, he would not stick rigidly to this principle if it were not in his interests to do so – as 
                                                          
77 CJI (287-289). 
78 Belenguer, Jaime I, p. 142. 
79 Belenguer, Jaime I, p. 142. 
80 CJI (289) 
81 ‘While we cannot be certain of the causes, either the Aragonese towns had no excess population 
available to claim the substantial barrios and households in Valencia awarded to them by Jaime in the 
Repartimiento of that city, or the townsmen of the Cordillera simply did not want to come. Zaragoza and 
Tarazona managed to utilize only about forty percent of the households allotted to them, Daroca under 
thirty-five percent and Calatayud less than twenty. Teruel was the only town, Catalan or Aragonese, to 
attain fiftyfive percent residency, while a small district bordering between the allotments of Teruel and 
Daroca reached only two percent.’ Powers, Society Organised for War, p. 82.  
82‘non fuerunt vel non venerint termino eisdem assignato; quorum talium hereditates possimus, 
quibuscunque voluerimus, dare, non obstante aliqua carta quam inde a nobis habuerunt; mandates baiulo 
et curie Valencie quod contra predicta non veniant nec venire faciant aut permitant...’. DJI, 2: (310). 
83‘quod ultima divisio ista perpetum valeat et habeat perpetuo…’. DJI, 2: (310). 
84 Belenguer, Jaimie I, p. 142. 
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in the case of rewarding the non-participant Hospitallers with land there.  From Valencia we 
can learn that it was common practice to anticipate major conquests in this period of the 
Reconquista and that land was sometimes divided accordingly beforehand. In light of this 
we can also learn that this pre-division could cause problems once the land was captured 
should there not be enough of it to reward ones followers according to prior promises. Most 
important, however, is the continual development of the theme whereby reward is fused with 
honour.  Despite the non-participation of the Hospitallers in the capture of Majorca, James 
wished to reward them for serving him loyally in the past in the expectation of their future 
honourable service, while the Hospitallers themselves felt that they would incur shame 
should they not receive a share of the spoils. Conversely, the Templars and magnates feared 
dishonour should James compensate the nonparticipant Hospitallers from their own hard-
won shares. According to the Llibre at least, James managed to resolve the matter whilst 
preserving the honour of all interested parties. For James, material reward was the natural 
by-product of chivalrous conduct and chivalrous conduct the natural vocation of the warrior. 
 
Division of moveable property 
 
‘How well he had rewarded his own vassals. He had enriched them all, knights and foot soldiers – 
you could not have found one poor man among them. Those who serve a good master are always well 
off!’85  
 
Thus El Poema del Mio Cid praises its protagonist Rodrigo Diaz de Vivar, after his 
conquest of Valencia. As already noted, booty  was the paramount concern of frontier Iberian 
society in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries and also perhaps a key driving force of the 
Reconquista itself. However, as both the nature and composition of this society encouraged 
independent frontier action such as raids and ambushes by relatively small feudal hosts or 
citizen militias, booty and gain, when referred to in the municipal charters and the Siete 
Partidas, did not so much pertain to lands and property that one might hope to acquire as the 
result of a great conquest such as that of Majorca, Valencia or Seville; but to moveables: 
treasure, livestock, military ordinance and prisoners.86 The extract above, from the El Poema 
del Mio Cid, not only defines the principle theme of that work, but also perfectly 
encapsulates the spirit of twelfth and thirteenth century Iberian warfare in reality. ‘The taking 
and dividing of booty provided the climax of all successful warfare.’87 It is easy to see why 
this was the case. As we have seen, booty not only encouraged men to prosecute war, but 
also to conduct themselves honourably on the battlefield. Alfonso X sets out several reasons 
for this: ‘it makes good men ambitious always to become better’; ‘so men expose themselves 
to danger to achieve rank’; ‘so that men avoid committing acts that might discredit them’.88 
Here we see again the intrinsic and deep rooted link between the chivalric or meritorious 
                                                          
85 Poem of the Cid, (74). 
86 For an explanation of the development and institutionalisation of these practices through the twelfth 
century charters and thirteenth century Alfonsine codes see Powers, Society Organized for War, pp. 162- 
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87 Powers, Society Organized for War, p. 165. 
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conduct that was expected of a man on the battlefield and the material reward he may expect 
for such behaviour.89  
Both the Siete Partidas and the municipal charters also describe in detail the 
compensations men should expect to receive should they incur injury on campaign. ‘The 
greatest fees went to injuries that caused permanent disability, including the lost opportunity 
to earn future booty in combat’. Powers provides a comparison table of the different fees 
stipulated in the twelfth century municipal charters and the Siete Partidas noting that the 
higher fees afforded by the thirteenth century Alfonsene code may be because of inflation.  
Once again the Llibre provides us with priceless examples of how these legal principles may 
have operated in practice. The division of moveable property after the capture of the city of 
Majorca (modern Palma) as described in the Llibre - the only time that an auction is referred 
to in the text – makes it clear why such stringent laws existed regarding the division of spoils. 
We must be cautious here, however, when applying general principles as established in the 
Castilian and Aragonese municipal charters and Siete Partidas when discussing the conduct 
of James’s largely Catalan force at Majorca, as we simply do not have the evidence that the 
same rules applied. We can, though, deduce from the examples provided in the Llibre that 
similar customs were expected.  
The Siete Partidas tells us,  
 
‘that when a town or fortress is taken by storm or stratagem, soldiers should not stop 
for plunder until they have taken the entire town and are masters of the 
fortifications.’90  
 
After this they should deliver to the king the place that they have taken, by putting him in 
possession of all fortifications. Once this had been done it is then advised that all moveable 
property should be gathered and rewards given to those who displayed exceptional courage 
or valour and compensation paid to the injured. After this the king or commander was 
entitled to one fifth of all booty (the quinto).91 Once this had been taken everything else 
should then be handed over to quadrilleros92 (dividers) who must then put all of the booty 
up for auction.93  Once the booty had been sold the quadrilleros were expected to give 
                                                          
89 Powers, Society Organized for War, pp. 168 – 169; for exactly what the Siete Partidas has to say on this 
matter see Siete Paridas vol: 2, 25 (Rewards and Reparations).  
90 Siete Partidas, 2:26: (19). 
91 Siete Partidas, 2:26: (19); though James does not tell us what percentage of the spoils he received at 
Majorca the near Poem of the Cid provides us with evidence that supports this assertion from the Siete 
Partidas. After the capture of Valencia the Poem tells us that ‘The Cid commanded his fifth share of the 
booty to be set apart.’ Poem of the Cid, (74). 
92 Though not explicitly mentioned in the Llibre the role of quadrillero seems to have been extremely 
important regarding the division of booty. According to the Siete Partidas they had to be men of the highest 
repute and were tasked not just with the distribution and record keeping of the spoils, but also to ensuring 
that this settlement was maintained. Siete Partidas, 2:26: (19, 20, 32); Their role is clearly referenced in the 
Poem of the Cid when it states after a successful ambush: ‘…ordered those charged with the task to 
distribute all this wealth, writing down every man’s share.’ Poem of the Cid, (25). 
93 Siete Partidas, 2:26: (20); for a description of the auction process see Siete Partidas, 2:26: (29 – 34). See 
also: Powers, Society Organised for War, pp. 165 – 167; Though evidence of such an institutionalised 
approach to the division of booty outside of Iberia is sparse, we do know from Villehardouin’s account of 
the Fourth Crusade that all booty captured during the sack of Constantinople was commanded to be 
‘gathered together and shared equally between the Franks and the Venetians.’ ‘Those found guilty of 
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everyone in the army his share of the money according to what he was entitled; as with the 
division of lands, each man’s entitlement was proportional to the amount of arms, men and 
animals which he had brought with him.94  
This, it seems, is what should have happened at Majorca, but it is clear that things 
did not go according to plan for James here. It is obvious that after the city’s capture the 
booty was not divided according to custom and that James lost control of his army as a result. 
The fact that James’s unfailingly self-aggrandizing chronicle even hints at this suggests that 
the situation there must have been quite critical, at least for a time. After the city was taken 
the bishops and nobles demanded that there was an ‘auction’ of the ‘Moors and the booty’ 
that had been captured. Though James states that he himself counselled against this, wishing 
instead to complete the conquest of the island before dividing the spoils, ultimately he 
acquiesced to the wishes of his nobles.95 It is most likely that James had custom on his side 
here, as the Siete Partidas advises that booty should not be divided until three days after a 
battle to allow for the pursuit and ultimate destruction of the fleeing enemy.96  
James then describes that there was further disagreement regarding how the booty 
should be divided, with the king arguing for a quick division, so that the men ‘will be happy’, 
but the nobles demanded an auction and again got their way.97 According to James the 
auction lasted from Carnival until Easter.98 Grave problems occurred, however, when the 
knights and militiamen were not given their share, which they were entitled to by law in 
Aragon and, it would seem, by custom at least in Cataluña:  
 
‘And when it was finished the knights and the people thought each would be given a 
share, and each awaited a share, since they did not want to pay for their share. And 
the knights came together with the people and said all over town: “This is wrong! 
This is evil”.’99  
 
And so they rioted and sacked the house of Gil de Alagón (a noble who had conducted the 
auction).100 According to James the riots persisted for a number of days and were not brought 
under control until he promised the men that ‘we would give them their share.’101  
Given all that we know about the nature and purpose of the Llibre, the loss of control 
of his army at Majorca is a remarkably candid admission for James to make, and it does not 
take a massive leap of the imagination to infer from the text that things most likely got quite 
ugly here.102 Nevertheless, the fact that the blame for what occurred is not really directed at 
the rioters, but at the nobles and their greed and bad council, is certainly consistent with 
other episodes we have observed. It seems, though, that James, as the commander of the 
                                                          
stealing met with severe justice – a good number were hanged.’ Joinville & Villehardouin: Chronicles of the 
Crusades, tr. Caroline Smith, (London: Penguin, 2008), pp. 5-135, (252 – 254). 
94 Siete Partidas, 2:26: (27). 
95 CJI (89). 
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97 CJI (89). 
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101 CJI (91). 
102 For a description as to what may have taken place at Majorca after the fall of the city see Belenguer, 
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army, was most to blame here because ultimate responsibility for overseeing a fair division 
lay with him.103 Therefore, with regards to the division of spoils, we can deduce that there 
were established customs, well known to Catalans and Aragonese alike, and that there may 
be dire consequences should they be seen to have been applied unfairly. After all, the idea 
of a fair partition is the foundation and basis of all of the Iberian codes relating to this 
division.104  
The most common type of warfare in twelfth and thirteenth century Iberia was the 
small scale raid with the dual purpose of both ravaging an enemy’s lands and the enrichment 
of the raiders. Raiding enemy territory is a principle theme of the El Poema del Mio Cid and 
the contemporary fame and popularity of this work is testimony to the habitual nature of this 
type of warfare. It is only natural, therefore, that James wished to present himself as an 
effective commander of raids in the Llibre, which, as one might expect, is littered with 
examples of his successes here.105 It is not, however, the historicity of these raids as they are 
described that concern us; for unlike the division of lands, which are well documented, it is 
much more difficult to corroborate what the Llibre tells us about raiding and the division of 
moveable property. Indeed O’Callaghan states that though ‘the spoils of war contributed 
mightily to economic growth… the evidence can hardly be quantified, as the chronicles 
speak in general terms of booty taken.’106 The Llibre is no different here, talking of booty 
generically and unquantifiably.  
The most frequently referenced type of booty obtained by James’s armies in the 
Llibre is that of enemy captives.107 Indeed, one might deduce from the text that the success 
of a raid could be directly judged by the number of prisoners that it managed to procure. For 
example, during the Borriana campaign of 1233, James tells us that he feared great dishonour 
if he returned from a large raid ‘having done no more harm than taking sixty male and female 
Saracen captives’.108 What we can learn here though pertains less to the division of spoils 
than to what can be deduced regarding the treatment of the vanquished. 
Before proceeding onto this final theme, however, it is perhaps worth reiterating the 
key points brought to the fore regarding the procurement and division of moveable property. 
The auction at Majorca as described by James not only provides a valuable example of a 
process described theoretically in the Siete Partidas and municipal charters, but also reveals 
how deeply rooted the custom of a fair division of the spoils – based on the proportionality 
of what an individual had committed to the enterprise – was in the contemporary mind-set, 
even in sparsely documented Cataluña. Also, what James is prepared to admit to us regarding 
the consequences of a potentially unfair division – which were almost certainly far graver 
                                                          
103 Of a commanders responsibilities here the Siete Partidas tells us that commanders of horse and foot 
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than he lets on – hammer home the importance of behaving in accordance with such 
established customs. However, though the Llibre devotes substantial chapters to raiding and 
the procurement of booty, what it tells us here is largely generic, unquantifiable and in line 
with other contemporary or near contemporary chronicles.109 
 
The treatment of the vanquished: captives, ransom and surrender terms 
 
A more fruitful use of the text can come from an analysis of what it tells us about the 
status of Muslim prisoners. Strickland argues that the practice of enslaving infidel prisoners 
of war and the resulting legal status of captives was one of the defining features of warfare 
in medieval Iberia and a crucial differential when comparing it with practices common in 
the rest of Western Europe after the eleventh century. He states that ‘the legality of enslaving 
non-Christians offered far greater flexibility for exploiting the financial potential of captives 
and made the consequences of defeat all the more severe’.110 James Brodman agrees arguing 
that ‘since warfare in twelfth-century Spain pitted Christians against Muslims, the usual 
prohibitions against enslavement of co-religionists clearly did not apply. For Muslims and 
Christians alike, capture meant a life of slavery’.111  The Siete Partidas makes a clear 
distinction between what it refers to as ‘prisoners’ and ‘captives’. According to the text a 
prisoner is someone ‘who confesses the same religion’ as his captor and should, on account 
of this, be treated well and ‘suffer no bodily harm’. Captives, however, as men who embrace 
‘another belief’ can be ‘put to death’, subjected to ‘cruel punishments’, or made use of as 
slaves, ‘compelling them to perform such arduous tasks that they will prefer death to life’.112  
Yvonne Friedman counters that while this may have been the case in the early phases 
of the Reconquista, by the thirteenth century Spanish society was less dependent on slave 
labour than the Latin East. In the Holy Land,  
 
‘the Franks [were] heavily engaged in erection of defensive works; consequently, 
they were reluctant to forfeit Muslim captives in exchange for Christian ones who 
could not be utilized similarly’.  
 
She argues that this was simply not the case in contemporary Iberia where the victorious 
Christians would use Muslim captives as a means of exchange.113 Add to this the fact that 
ransom prices ‘frequently exceeded what could be gained in the slave auctions, redemption 
became an attractive option to both captor and captive’.114   
This commitment to ransoming captives can be corroborated by the establishment 
and flourishing growth of redemptionist orders such as the orders of Santiago (1180) and of 
Merced (1230) in Iberia. Friedman argues that the main reason that the redemptonist orders 
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became far more entrenched in Spanish society than in the Latin East is because ‘the 
meritorious deed of ransoming captives was considered more essential in Reconquista Spain 
than in the Crusader Kingdom of Jerusalem’.115 She reasons further that another cause for 
this might be that the established orders of the East (the Hospital and the Temple) may not 
have wanted new ones on their territory. 116 This, though, surely cannot have been the case, 
as it was those same orders who were the leading players in Aragon and Cataluña when the 
order of Merced was established there in 1230. Her first point, however, is backed by 
evidence from Brodman who has shown, through studying the municipal charters, that there 
was a long-standing communal commitment by the citizen militias to their members which 
led to a strong feeling of responsibility to captives.117   
It is clear from the Llibre that a very high premium was placed on the procurement 
of captives, but it seems not so much because of their potential value as slaves, but for their 
worth as hostages to be ransomed or exchanged. Perhaps the most blatant, but certainly not 
the only, example of this in the text, can be taken from a series of events that followed the 
capture of the Tower of Montcada in 1235. James tells us here that after the fall of the tower, 
he had some Saracen men in his retinue choose for him one hundred of the best Muslim 
prisoners from among the ‘one thousand one hundred and forty-seven’ captives; with the 
word ‘best’ here pertaining to their ransom value.118 In the subsequent chapter James then 
records the capture of a further sixty Muslims from the town of Museros, who he states were 
‘worth more alive than dead’.119 The reason for this, as James subsequently describes, was 
not their value as slaves, but their worth as prisoners to be ransomed or exchanged. In this 
case these sixty captives were exchanged for Guillem d’Aguiló, the nephew of Guillem 
Saguárdia, who was a magnate in James’s retinue.120 Lastly, James informs us that he was 
able to ransom the original one hundred captives from the Tower of Montcada for ‘seventeen 
thousand bezants’, which he was able to use to pay the merchants who had funded his 
campaign and were now ‘pressing [him] for money’.121  
Indeed, as Brodman has shown, James’s commitment to the recovery of Christian 
prisoners can be evinced by his patronage of the Mercedarians in his lands, who were 
committed to this purpose.122 This being said, however, much like James’s commitments to 
other principles, such as the proportional division of spoils, it was subservient to a practical 
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commitment to his own advancement and interest. To illustrate this point we might refer to 
an illuminating and candid story revealed in the text regarding the siege of Xátiva in May 
1240. Here, James tells us that he began the siege with the sole intention of liberating the 
Christian hostages held there, but once he saw the stronghold, he decided that he wanted to 
take the fortress so much, that he refused to abandon the siege even when the defenders 
offered to give up the prisoners: ‘our desire to take Xátiva was greater than our desire to 
recover the knights.’123 He even records that he went as far as lying to Don Rodrigo Lizana, 
whose cousin was one of the captives, that the Moors ‘did not wish to deliver them.’124 As 
we have seen, this is certainly consistent with the other examples whereby James’s interests 
have overridden his principles.    
In contrast, there is only one explicit reference to the enslavement of a substantial 
number of defeated Moors125; and it must be stated here, that it seems to have been very 
much an exception that went against the grain of James’s general and preferred practice. In 
the aftermath of the conquest of Majorca James tells us:  
 
‘concerning the Saracens of the island who had gone up into the hills, we enslaved 
them to do with them what we wished, and we gave them to whomsoever wanted 
them, so that they could live on the territory as slaves.’126  
 
This extremely matter-of-fact sentence is worth contextualising however. Firstly, it is only 
the Moors of the island who held out in the mountains after the initial conquest that James 
is referring to here, which perhaps explains his tone. After all, what else might they expect? 
Secondly, the sentence comes after several paragraphs of James explaining how good his 
relations were with the defeated Moors who had surrendered to him: 
 
‘ever since we made this pact with them, we have obtained as much gain or more 
than was then agreed… And every year we receive from them, without needing to 
ask for it such things as they collect for us.’127  
 
It must be said that the latter extract is far more in keeping with the general tone and 
purpose of the Llibre with regards the treatment of Muslim captives. Belenguer, however, is 
of the opinion that the lot of Majorca’s Muslims was far more draconian than James is 
prepared to let on; he guesses that few Moors remained on the island at all and that perhaps 
only one thousand retained their liberty.128 He does, though, argue that Majorca was the 
exception rather than the rule regarding how James treated his Muslim captives, perhaps 
because it was an island and difficult to defend.129 Antoni Mas agrees, professing that ‘if one 
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thing characterises the conquest of Majorca with respect to the other Catalan/Aragonese 
conquests, it is its destructive character.’130 
The question that remains to be answered here is why does the Llibre devote so much 
more time to its description of ransoming captives than their enslavement and what can we 
learn here regarding the conduct of war? The is rooted in both Iberian reality and the nature 
of the text. It is certainly true, as Brodman has proved, that there was a long-standing custom 
and commitment of the Iberian militias to redeem their members who had been taken as 
captives, with the exchange of Muslim prisoners the most expedient means of doing this. By 
the thirteenth century this custom was codified in the Siete Partidas. It is also true that the 
victorious Christian kingdoms were in greater need of capital than labour, with James 
himself being perennially short of funds. These reasons, based on the evolution of custom, 
however, do not reveal the full picture; for this we must look to the nature and purpose of 
James’s chronicle.  
Primarily, the Llibre is a book of chivalry applied to the practical context. It can be 
argued that there was a gradual evolution in the conduct of cross-cultural warfare between 
Muslims and Christians in this period, influenced by prolonged association and developing 
codes of chivalry. Contemporary chronicles both from Iberia and the Latin East describe 
how a mutual respect and understanding had developed between enemies who had shown 
what they considered to be meritorious conduct.  For example, Ambroise, in his account of 
Richard the Lionheart’s crusade says of the Muslims of Acre that ‘had they not been infidels 
no better people could ever have been seen.’131 Similar sentiments are also expressed in El 
Poema del Mio Cid towards the campeador’s Moorish foes. When El Cid left the fortress of 
Alcocer it is said that ‘the Moors were sorry to see him go’. They exclaimed, ‘you are going, 
Cid, may our prayers go before you! We are all satisfied with the way you have treated us.’132 
The Llibre itself, as we shall soon observe in more detail, is strewn with examples of James 
enjoying cordial relations with his enemies. He punished harshly those who broke his truces 
with the Moors, spoke highly of Muslim vassals, and prided himself on his knowledge of 
Muslim custom, taking great care not to break their laws.133  
Such attitudes are not those of the fundamentalist crusader. The development of late 
twelfth and thirteenth century chivalric ideals had a great bearing not just on the conduct 
expected of one’s own forces, but also on how an enemy should be treated, co-religionist or 
not. This, along with the socio-economic factors described hitherto, and as the result of 
centuries of cross-cultural pollination along the Iberian frontier, goes some way to explaining 
why, by James’s time, ransom of Moorish prisoners seemed preferable to enslavement.  
The final and overriding concern here though, is one of practicality. It was James’s 
intention, and by the end of his life a reality, that he would control nearly as much former 
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Muslim territory as the Christian lands that he had inherited. It was simply not in his interests 
to enslave or evict vast swathes of the human resources of his newly conquered lands. As 
we have seen from the attempted repartiments, Aragon and Cataluña simply did not have 
the surplus populations to make this viable. Valencia was the richest and best administered 
region of Spain and James needed to retain the services of the people who made it so. It 
would, therefore, have been self-defeating for him to describe acts of wanton injustice meted 
out to people, who, by the end of his life, made up a large and highly taxable proportion of 
his subjects. These arguments can be further vindicated by an analysis of James’s approach 
to surrender agreements. 
 
Surrender Agreements  
 
‘To watch King Jaume at his negotiations is to comprehend better a contemporary attitude toward 
crusade and Muslims. What charters, laws and privileges reveal in an abstract way, these very human 
scenes illustrate graphically.’134 
 
It is evident that James faced two alternatives when arranging terms: he could either 
expel or enslave his Muslim opponents according to the laws of war; or he could come to 
accommodation with them by guaranteeing their religious freedoms and traditional customs, 
integrating them into his kingdom as subjects.135 There is evidence from the Llibre and 
crown documents that supports both courses of action. Indeed, as the evidence regarding the 
status of the Mudejars136 in conquered Valencia is relatively sparse – especially when we 
consider how well documented James’s reign was – it used to be common among historians 
to assume that subject Moors had been expelled, or at best that they had stayed on in urban 
areas only as oppressed serfs. Menedez Pidal tells us that in contrast to the Cid’s benign 
treatment of Mudejars, the victorious monarchs of the thirteenth century – James I of Aragon 
and Ferdinand III of Castile – confiscated Moorish estates and expelled them from their lands 
only allowing them to stay in rural areas and only because they were essential there.137 
Francisco Fernadez y González has also upheld this view, believing that conciliatory pacts 
with the defeated Moors were the exception rather than the rule in the kingdom of 
Valencia.138 More recently, however, scholars such as Burns and José Vincente Gómez 
Bayarri have contested this interpretation. Let us consider the evidence.139 
The two most striking examples of surrender described in the text are Borriana 1233 
and Valencia 1238. Borriana was the key to Northern Valencia and thus an incredibly 
important prize for James. Indeed, this was the scene where he had to bargain with Pere 
Martel and Bernat Santaeugénia for their ships, and also where, when it looked as though he 
may fail in his endeavours, he revealed that he was prepared to make himself the target of 
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Muslim archers, so as wounded he might lift his siege with dignity.140 When James finally 
took the town it is clear that the inhabitants were expelled: ‘it was agreed that they should 
all leave… with what they could carry on their backs and in their hands.’141 Though this is 
not in keeping with the cosmopolitan and conciliatory image presented in other chapters, it 
is worth remembering that Borriana had put up stiff resistance for ‘two months’142, yet the 
population was not enslaved and there is no evidence of the city being sacked. A negotiated 
expulsion was perhaps the best compromise for James here. The defenders had taken things 
too far to have any hope of reasonable terms and it also allowed James, whose own supplies 
were short, to obtain control of a well provisioned citadel in an orderly manner. He tells us 
that the town was well stocked with bread ‘which would be of benefit to those who guarded 
the frontier’. Also, that he did not wish to risk storming it because of the disputes and 
lawlessness that this might cause amongst the ‘Catalans and the Aragonese and the many 
foreign people who were there’; indicating both the tension within his realm and reminding 
us that his campaign was a crusade.143 
An even more valuable prize than Borriana was Valencia itself, where surrender 
negotiations followed a similar pattern. King Zayyan had put up robust resistance and when 
this had been overcome James wanted matters brought to a speedy conclusion. To retain 
control of the situation he promised safe conduct out of the city as far as Cullera for the 
defeated Moors. As at Borriana, he reasoned that if he had to take the town by force ‘great 
disputes’ would arise between the men of the army ‘over vile assets or belongings’.144  
According to James, his nobles ‘went pale, as if somebody had wounded them straight to the 
heart’, when presented with the surrender as a fait accompli, as it denied them the 
opportunity of plunder.145 On the third day after the surrender the Llibre states that ‘some 
fifty thousand men and women’ departed Valencia, and despite the fact that James had to 
‘wound fatally, men who wished to rob the belongings of the Saracens and seize some 
Saracen women and children’, he says that they only lost ‘a thousand sous in value, so well 
did [he] have them protected until Cullera’.146 Burns, however, states that many of the more 
enterprising crusaders ‘bypassed the convoy penetrating into the Islamic zone beyond the 
point of safeguard to fall upon the refugees in the mountain passes.’147 
The pattern that seems to develop here is one in which Muslim populations were 
generally expelled from their towns and homes to make way for their Christian conquerors. 
Further evidence for expulsion can also be gleaned from James’s proclamations of eviction 
of all of the Moors of his realms in 1248 during the al-Azraq rebellion; but as shown hitherto, 
there is little evidence that he ever made good on such threats.  
On closer examination, however, it can be shown that the expulsions of Borriana and 
Valencia were the exception rather than the rule and that conciliation and integration were 
James’s preferred modus operandi. The surrender treaty for Valencia itself does not just 
corroborate the Llibre in telling us that the Moors received safe passage to Cullera, but also 
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shows that James was in fact, even more lenient here than suggested, as it also allowed Moors 
to stay if they wished: 
 
‘We promise that you and all Moors can leave safe and sound with your 
weapons…Or those who want to stay can be safe and sound… For seven years we 
will not make damage, misfortune or war on land or sea, nor allow this to happen 
against Cullera… And if anyone does so, we will put it right.’ 148 
 
Yet, even if the entire Muslim populations of Borriana and Valencia were expelled 
and some pillaged on their departure by opportunistic crusaders, their lot would still have 
been superior to that of many others on the wrong side of a protracted thirteenth century 
siege. It was not uncommon for entire garrisons to be slaughtered and towns sacked; Edward 
I of England’s sacking of Berwick in 1298 being a prime example.  
Other charters show greater attempts at conciliation and also common themes of 
freedom of religion and retention of established (Moorish) custom. Both Burns and Gómez 
Bayarri identify seven in particular: Xivert (Templars, 1234), Eslida (royal, 1242), Uxó 
(royal 1250), Xátiva (royal, 1252), Silla (Hospitallers, 1258), Tales (Peter of Castellnou, 
1260), and several peace treaties issued by James and his successor Peter III after the 
rebellions of 1275-76 (royal, 1276-79).149 In origin half of them are royal, deriving from 
James or Peter, one is baronial, and two come from military orders. Two are surrender pacts 
from the crusade, three are arrangements after the revolts of 1248 and 1275-76, and two are 
settlement charters designed to attract Muslim immigration.150 Though their circumstances 
might be different, their charitable stipulations are broadly similar with regards to religious 
tolerance, property rights and royal protection. Furthermore, as they span more or less the 
entire period of James’s involvement in Valencia, when taken as a set they provide strong 
evidence for the uniformity of his approach to the vanquished there.   
The Uxó peace treaty, is particularly useful in showing how James’s policy of 
conciliation remained consistent, even after the strain of the rebellions. The Llibre tells us 
that when the men of Uxó indicated to James that they wished to surrender after the fall of 
Almenara in March 1238, a charter was made ‘respecting their law and their customs, such 
as they were accustomed to have in the time of the Saracens.’151 Though this charter does 
not survive, we can infer that its terms must have been at least as generous as those of 1250 
– which reassured the Moors of their civil, legal and religious customs – after the town had 
surrendered for a second time.152  
Further evidence of James’s conciliatory policy can be found in his description of 
negotiations at Almenara during the same campaign of 1238. When the Moorish delegates 
each asked for an inheritance of three jovates of land along with thousands of livestock and 
luxurious cloths for ‘their relatives to wear’, James happily agreed, stating: ‘as the old 
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proverb says: “He who does not give what grieves him, does not get what he wants”.’153 The 
chapter concludes with James self-satisfactorily describing his knowledge of Moorish 
custom by sending them a live crane to eat.154 The fact that such descriptions are relatively 
common in the text and that James’s tone when describing them is self-congratulatory, 
shows that he wished to present a cosmopolitan image of his kingship. 
His benign treatment of the vanquished can be further corroborated in his description 
of the Murcia campaign of 1264-66. Here, the king was at pains to point out to the Moors of 
Murcia how well they might be treated should they surrender to him without resistance. To 
get the point across he cited his good treatment of the Muslims of Valencia who had come 
to his mercy and were able to ‘practice their religion just as if they were in the lands of the 
Saracens’, thus implying that his benevolent reputation preceded him.155 If James was 
draconian in his treatment of his Muslim enemies, he certainly went to elaborate lengths to 
conceal this in his chronicle.  
Why then did James proceed thus, even after promising the pope that he would expel 
all of the Saracens from his lands? Gómez Bayarri argues that because his goals regarding 
the resettlement of conquered territory were not met he had to take lenient and conciliatory 
measures in order to maintain the Muslim population to ensure the sustainability of his new 
kingdom.156 This sits well with James’s pragmatism, and is certainly a very significant 
factor; but it is not the only one. Belenguer reminds us here that chronicles and charters can 
only at best provide an idealised and prescribed account of the past, and that what they say 
can often be challenged by circumstantial evidence. He reasons that we need only look to 
the numerous Mudejar revolts of the 1240s, 1250s and 1270s, to realise that this was not a 
time of social integration in Valencia. Muslim rights and customs may have been guaranteed, 
but they nevertheless remained second class citizens in the new Christian society; itself a 
copy of the islamic dhimma, which by its division of peoples by their faith inherently 
encouraged separation not integration. Therefore, the true extent of the reality of James’s 
conciliation remains clouded.  
The fate of Xátiva perhaps best illustrates Belenguer’s point. At first, according to 
the chronicle at least, it was treated kindly, but later joined the rebellions with the ultimate 
result being the expulsion of the Muslim population. Xátiva – ‘the key to the kingdom [of 
Valencia]’ – was obviously important to James as he besieged it three times (1239, 1240 and 
1244).157 After the second in 1240, he demanded that the alcaid158 hand over either Xátiva 
or the castle of Castelló. The alcaid promised him Castelló and also swore to become 
James’s vassal.’159 In late December 1243, however, the Moors of Xátiva counter-raided a 
marauding party led by James’s vassal, Don Rodrigo Lizana, the governor of Valencia, 
making off with his booty.  
Subsequently, James summoned the alcaid to appear before him and reminded him 
of the terms of their relationship as written in their charters. James mentions something here 
of the nature of such charters, stating that they were ‘divided equally’, ‘according to a. b. c.’, 
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with alcaid retaining one part and he the other.160 The alcaid then refused to accept James’s 
choice of Don Ferdinand as a judge for the case, which bemused James whose law and 
custom dictated that superior lords have the right to appoint judges in such cases. The whole 
episode revealed the two sides’ lack of understanding of each other’s laws and customs. As 
a result James besieged Xátiva for a third time, capturing it in August 1244.161 Thus, the 
final centres of resistance in southern Valencia were persuaded to surrender also, with the 
Moors there allowed to ‘remain in the kingdom.’162 It was only after they joined the revolts 
of 1248 that James decided to expel the Moors of Xátiva. Even here, however, he is at pains 
to express the humanity of the expulsion. Fearful of being robbed on their departure the 
Muslims promised James half of their moveable property in return for their safe passage. 
The king is most ardent in his emphasis that he had already promised them his protection 
and thus, 
 
‘to take advantage of them, when they were losing their houses, their inheritances 
and their homeland, and after we had given our word to them that they might leave 
safely and securely from our land? On no account did we wish to do so. For we were 
pained at the harm we were doing them; and our heart could not bear the idea that 
we should give them further pain on top of that by taking anything from them that 
they were carrying.’163 
 
As with regards to the treatment of captives, James’s perception of chivalry is 
prominent here. The chronicle is full of examples of him going out of his way to relay his 
understanding of Muslim custom and to tell us of his merciful and benign treatment of his 
vanquished enemies – of which the expulsion of the Moors of Xátiva is a most striking 
illustration. His notion of Chivalric Kingship clearly entailed an understanding and fair 
treatment of one’s foes, and this in part explains his actions; perhaps not always in reality, 
but certainly as they have been described to us in his chronicle. 
The overall impression given by the Llibre with regards to surrender terms is 
therefore, one of magnanimity and tolerance. Even the expulsions of Moorish populations at 
Borriana, Valencia and Xátiva are described with feeling and humility. It also must be 
remembered here that each of these towns had put up stiff resistance that could easily have 
led to terrible consequences. The reasons for James’s actions were twofold. Primarily they 
are rooted in pragmatism; as Bayyari has described, his inability to resettle the conquered 
territory with Christians meant that he had to come to some sort of understanding with the 
Moorish inhabitants for the sustainability of the kingdom. Furthermore, quickly negotiated 
surrenders, such as those achieved at Valencia and Borriana, allowed the king to retain 
control of the situation at the expense of his vassals who were hungry for the spoils of pillage. 
It is likewise clear, though, that ideological impulses were also a factor. James’s descriptions 
of his dealings and treatment of vanquished Muslims were grounded in his concept of 
                                                          
160 CJI (334); Charters were written on the same a-b-c sheet by scribe on a single parchment in bilingual 
interlinear form, separating the two by letters of the alphabet across the page, so that both parties could 
prove authenticity of his version by fitting it to that of the other signatory. Burns, ‘How to End a Crusade’, p. 
125. 
161 CJI (354-365). 
162 CJI (360). 
163 CJI (369). 
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chivalry. However, as Belenguer has shown, the fact that Moorish Valencia was in a state of 
almost perpetual rebellion for much of James’s reign, tells us that the conciliatory veneer of 
the Llibre masks the reality of a somewhat uneasy and fissiparous accord. 
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Conclusion: 
 
The Llibre dels Fets is without doubt one of the most instructive and authoritative sources 
for the study of medieval chivalric kingship in action. Not only is it a vernacular work written 
by a warrior, but its royal authorship means that it offers us a singularly unique insight into 
the nature of a king’s perceptions of authority and of conduct in war.  
We have seen how the text provides an invaluable instruction as to how James 
believed a king should conduct himself with regards to his subjects, the application of his 
laws and most importantly on the battlefield. Through James’s edifying stories we observe 
that the key force driving his behaviour in every aspect of his authority is the buttressing and 
preservation of his honour through the application of what he perceived to be chivalric 
kingship. In this regard the accuracy of James’s chronicle matters far less than its sentiment, 
just as the primary purpose of the Llibre is to guide his heirs in kingship rather than to instruct 
them in history. It is, however, through James’s description of conduct on the battlefield 
where the text provides its greatest instruction. Through his anecdotes and examples we learn 
how the key aspects of chivalry – honour through prowess, the role of the commander, the 
importance of loyalty and the avoidance of shame – should be put into practice. 
 It is also evident that James regarded crusading to be the ultimate expression of regal 
honour. Though he is not forthcoming in revealing papal involvement in his campaigns and 
rarely mentions key tenets of crusading such as the taking of the cross, it is nonetheless clear 
from his deployment of religious language and imagery that he felt his endeavours to be 
divinely inspired. This comes across throughout the Llibre, but it is most concentrated and 
overt during his description of his conquest of Majorca. This was perhaps because it was his 
first success against the Saracens, coming as it did after his failure at Peñíscola in 1224, and 
he may have remembered it through a prism of youthful idealism. It is also highlighted by 
the deep and obvious shame James felt in having to abandon his expedition to the Holy Land 
in 1269 and also by the reverence he expresses in meeting the pope for the first time at the 
Council of Lyons in 1274.1 For James, there was no distinction between his secular honour, 
achieved through his conquests, and the honour due to God who was his superior lord. 
Indeed, it was most likely to highlight the perfidy of his own vassals that he returns to the 
theme of crusade during the Valencian campaign. In telling us that the thought of abandoning 
his position at El Puig made him fear two things, the first that ‘it would grieve God’ and the 
second that he would incur ‘the shame of this world’, James is seamlessly integrating his 
own fortunes with those of God.2  
His perception of his relationship with God is, however, illustrated most plainly when 
he recalls frantically praying during a Mediterranean storm that threatened to sabotage his 
invasion of Majorca. He reasoned and bargained that it would be God and not himself who 
would suffer the greater loss if the conquest was not successful. For James, his deeds against 
the Moors not only enhanced his earthly renown but were also, as he frequently reminds us, 
the will of the Lord for which he was the mere conduit. This fusion of secular and celestial 
honour was integral to his ideal of chivalric kingship. 
                                                          
1 CJI (476-477, 542). 
2 CJI (239). 
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The Llibre is also an extremely useful source in helping us understand how the laws 
of war were applied in Iberia in a practical sense in the thirteenth century. This is especially 
so when it is contextualised and analysed in conjunction with the more theoretical and near 
contemporary Siete Partidas; while the latter offers the legal principle, James’s chronicle 
can be used to provide us with an insight into how things may have proceeded in practice. 
Through its descriptions of the division of lands and booty we can observe two themes: the 
king’s pragmatism and commitment to emerging legal principles, and also the link between 
material reward and preserved honour. If we take the Majorca campaign as an example, it is 
clear that James wished to both uphold the emerging legal principle that reward be 
proportional to investment (of troops and resources) and also be used as incentive to 
encourage men to behave honourably and excel in battle.3 When, however, these interests 
were in conflict it is evident that James preferred to reward honour and loyalty over 
upholding principle. This is best evinced by the fact that he donated a substantial portion of 
land to the Hospitallers after the capture of Majorca despite the fact that they had not 
participated in the campaign itself; a calculated decision in acknowledgement of their 
previous loyalty and in expectation of their future honourable service. 
The marriage of pragmatism and chivalric pretences can also be observed in James’s 
dealings with his Islamic enemies. His failure to resettle newly conquered Valencian territory 
with Christian colonists caused him many problems. James’s immediate need to maintain 
the economic viability of his new kingdom meant that draconian policies directed at its 
predominantly Muslim population were out of the question, even if he had favoured them. 
This, coupled with his desire to outmanoeuvre his barons with quickly negotiated surrenders 
with his foes, goes some way to explain the largely benevolent nature of his policy towards 
them. However, any explanation rooted solely in pragmatism cannot be wholly satisfactory 
here. The gradual evolution of the conduct of cross-cultural warfare between Muslims and 
Christians, influenced by developing codes of chivalry must also be taken into account. 
Contemporary chronicles both from Iberia and the Latin East describe how a mutual respect 
had developed between enemies of different faiths.  Indeed, the Llibre is strewn with 
examples of James going out of his way to relay his understanding of Muslim custom and to 
tell us of his merciful and benign treatment of his vanquished enemies. Thus chivalric 
kingship, in James’s perception, clearly entailed the fair treatment of one’s foes, even if they 
did not share his faith. His actions regarding his defeated enemies can therefore also be 
explained, in part, by his idealism. Though this was perhaps not always the case in reality, it 
is certainly as they have been described to us in his chronicle. 
Taken as a whole, the Llibre reveals a very idealistic yet pragmatic author. James 
had a clear vision of kingly conduct and this is presented to us through how he chronicles 
his dealings with his subjects, his enemies and his God. Though at times forced to 
compromise on idealism, his overriding principles of preserving honour (largely his own), 
avoiding shame and carrying out the will of the Lord are preeminent in the text. These are 
the key pillars of his chivalric kingship and the instructions that he wished to leave his heirs. 
 
                                                          
3 CJI (55) 
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